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Summary 
 
The mostly clay cliffs of Barton-on-Sea, Hampshire, comprise inhomogeneous strata of 
the  Bracklesham,  Barton  and  Headon  Hill  Formations,  overlain  unconformably  by 
Plateau Gravels, and have a long history of erosion and instability. Heavily-engineered 
stabilisation  works  involving  a  1,500m-long  sheet-piled  wall  and  cut-off  drain  were 
installed in the 1960s but a number of catastrophic failures of the wall have occurred at 
locations along the Barton frontage since then. This report is concerned with the failures 
at Cliff House Hotel / Tom’s Garden and at Hoskins Gap West. 
 
Extensive monitoring of the cliffs over the past sixty years has produced a large and 
diverse  dataset  which  has  been  compiled,  analysed  and  assessed  in  this  report.  This 
includes inclinometer, piezometer and rainfall records, topographic surveying, aerial and 
ground  photography,  borehole  and  exposures  logs,  consultants’  reports,  engineering 
drawings and newspaper articles.  
 
This report identifies characteristics of the key periods of activity at the two locations and 
compares and contrasts them. Maps of the areas of activity, cliff-top retreat, revetment 
movement  and  drainage  patterns  are  provided.  Fieldwork  undertaken  for  the  project 
includes  the  logging  of  three  cliff  exposures  and  the  surveying  of  four  cross-section 
profiles. Drawing on the information available it charts the progress of instability in the 
two study areas, suggests possible mechanisms for the failures and offers a prediction of 
future activity based upon the mechanisms described. 
 
(224 words) 
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1.  Introduction 
 
1.1.  Location and Environmental Context 
 
Between Christchurch, Dorset and Milford-on-Sea, Hampshire, around the seaside resort 
of Barton-on-Sea, the English southern coastline is denoted by cliffs of up to 31m height 
in soft sedimentary (often very fine-grained) Eocene strata, capped unconformably by 
Pleistocene gravels and brickearths (Melville & Freshney 1982, Barton 1973, Fig. 1.1). 
The cliffs front onto Christchurch Bay, which is a part of the English Channel (formerly a 
section of the Solent River system – Tomalin 2000) and are largely exposed to south-
westerly gales from the Atlantic, although Durlston Head (bordering Poole Bay to the 
west) and Hengistbury Head (and the Christchurch Ledge that extends south-eastwards 
from it) offer some protection, particularly to the western end of the cliffs at Highcliffe 
(Fig. 1.1).  Between the cliff top and foreshore is an undercliff of degraded landslide 
material and exposed in-situ Eocene Barton Clay and Barton Sand 50 – 100m wide. 
 
1.2.  Shoreline Processes 
 
The coast here is subject to eastward littoral drift which has historically recharged the 
beaches around Barton, until increasing levels of coast protection at Bournemouth led to 
a decrease in the quantity of sediment during the mid-twentieth century. Beach depletion 
provoked more frequent oversteepening of the weak clay cliffs and, in turn, increased 
landslide  activity  along  the  Highcliffe  and  Barton-on-Sea  frontage.  From  the  earliest 
Ordnance Survey map of the area (1871) to 1960, cliff recession was estimated at c1m 
per annum (Halcrow 1978b). 
 
1.3.  Protection Works 
 
Extensive protection works involving landslide toe protection with a revetment, groynes 
to  retain  sediment,  various  drainage  and  regrading  works  and  a  cut-off  wall  in  the 
undercliff have been made by the two local authorities Christchurch Borough Council   2 
(west of Chewton Bunny, Fig. 1.2) and Lymington Borough Council (New Forest District 
Council  after  the  boundary  changes  of  1974,  to  the  east)  since  1960  in  attempts  to 
stabilise  the  undercliff  area  and  prevent  further  cliff  retreat,  but  these  have  not  met 
entirely  with  success.  Several  major  landslides  have  led  to  failure  of  sections  of 
undercliff, whilst other areas have retained a more stable state. Much monitoring has 
taken place, including the installation of inclinometers and piezometers, frequent regular 
surveying of specific points and cliff profiles, recording of rainfall data and the logging 
of boreholes drilled into the undercliff. This has produced a considerable dataset upon 
which this report draws in attempting to analyse the processes and recent progress of 
ground instability at Barton-on-Sea.  
 
1.4.  Data Sources 
 
Much of this information was available from the archives of New Forest District Council, 
but other sources contacted include High-Point Rendel, the Channel Coast Observatory, 
Halcrow,  Soil  Mechanics  Ltd,  John  Cross,  William  Moxey  and  the  New  Milton 
Advertiser and Lymington Times, and it was necessary to obtain specialist software from 
Soil Instruments Ltd. Additionally a number of site visits have been made, new surveys 
of  cross-shore  profiles  recorded and logs  made  of exposures of  key  marker  horizons 
within the undercliff area. 
 
1.5.  Project Objectives 
 
The initial objectives of this project were to collate, analyse and interpret all the available 
data pertaining to the landslide in the vicinity of Cliff House Hotel on the western portion 
of  the  Barton-on-Sea  frontage  (Fig.  1.3),  to  describe  the  progress  of  this  zone  of 
instability and to attempt to assess the process or processes promoting instability here. 
During the research period it became  apparent that distinct differences  existed in the 
character and progress of the various landslides within the Barton Clay cliffs and the 
objectives were modified to additionally incorporate an analysis of the Hoskins Gap West 
slide.  This  gave  the  opportunity  to  compare  and  contrast  these  two  areas  of  activity,   3 
separated by only 150m of relatively stable undercliff, and to comment on the possible 
reasons for the stability of the intermediate ground.  
 
Therefore, although reference will be made to other sections of the Christchurch Bay 
coastline, this report will study in detail the western section of the defended Barton-on-
Sea frontage – the area between Tom’s Garden and Fishermans Walk (Fig. 1.2) – with 
particular emphasis on the two major landslide complexes that have developed at Cliff 
House Hotel and at Hoskins Gap West.  
 
The report will: 
•  Offer  possible  explanations  for  similarities  and  differences  between  these  two 
failures; 
•  Where  possible,  attempt  to  determine  planes  of  weakness  and  preferred  slide 
planes at the two locations; 
•  Attempt to illustrate how construction of protection works may have led to relative 
stability in some areas, but instability in others; 
•  Seek to identify the features of protection works that have been beneficial, and 
those that have been detrimental to long-term stability of the Barton Clay cliffs; 
•  Attempt to predict how these two landslides will develop in the future, and what 
measures might be taken to ameliorate or mitigate the worst effects. 
 
   4 
 
 
 Fig. 1.1 Large-scale map of the Christchurch Bay area showing location of Barton-on-Sea.   5 
 
Fig. 1.2. General plan of the Barton-on-Sea frontage between Naish Farm and east of Fisherman’s Walk, showing the inclinometer 
positions before I1A was lost in the 2001 Cliff House Hotel landslide. 
   6 
 
Fig. 1.3 The main areas of the protected section of cliff at Barton-on-Sea affected by landslides.    7 
2. Geology and Geomorphology 
 
2.1.  Eocene and Pleistocene Strata 
 
The  Eocene  sequence  covers  from  the  Bracklesham  beds  at  the  bottom,  through  the 
Barton  Clays  and  Barton  Sands  and  up  into  the Headon  Hill  Formation,  and  dips  at 
approximately 0.75° to the ENE (Fig. 2.1). This dip is away from the coast but the angle 
of dip is shallow enough to be considered practically horizontal when  viewed across 
(normal to) the shore. The significance of the dip is to potentially expose the full 46.4m 
thickness  of  the  Barton  Clay  alongshore  in  a  cliff  of  c30m  height  (Fig.  2.2).  The 
Christchurch Bay cliffline is cut by two valleys, but only the one at Chewton Bunny 
affects the Barton Clay sequence (Fig. 2.2). 
 
The Barton Clays are a series of deposits of overconsolidated, deeply-fissured marine 
clays (Barton 1973) divided into distinct geological sub-layers (labelled A-G) on account 
of  their  included  fossils  by  Burton  (1933).  There  are  several  key  strata  that  act  as 
‘marker’ layers; these include bands of nodular concretions near the top of the C and F1 
zones and a densely-packed shell-rich band (the G zone). Above the G zone clay with 
sandy lenses grades upwards to fine silty sand forming the base of the Barton Sands. This 
layer is variously called the H zone or the Chama Bed.  
 
The  Plateau  Gravels  form  a  stratum  with  much  higher  permeability,  allowing  the 
infiltration and ‘ponding’ of groundwater above the clay layers, and periglacial features 
such as frost wedge casts lead to fissuring deep into the clay (Barton & Thompson 1986). 
This allows deeper infiltration of water and consequently greatly elevated pore water 
pressures  in  the  clay,  observed  particularly  within  10m  of  the  cliff  edge  (Barton  & 
Thompson 1986). In previous research planes of relative weakness have been identified 
within three Barton Clay layers (the A2/A3, C/D and F1/F2 boundaries) and these have 
been observed to form the bases of compound failures in the cliff (Barton 1973, Barton et 
al 1983, Barton & Coles 1984). Four other slide planes are also indicated in Barton et al 
(2006). Consequently the cliffs are highly degraded and show a ‘bench’ topography, with   8 
rubble  fields  covering  the  slide  planes  and  scree  accumulating  at  the  foot  of  each 
backscar (Barton 1973). This limits exposure of the in-situ beds (Figs. 2.3, 2.5).  
 
Under  Naish  Farm  the  D  zone  and  upper  benches  underlie  wide,  sloping  bands  of 
disrupted  colluvium  dipping  from  west  to  east.  Where  exposed  the  D  zone  bench  is 
identifiable by the presence of the C zone nodules (Fig. 2.6), but only at its extreme 
western end is the F zone nodule layer visible just below the slide plane of the upper 
bench (Fig. 2.7), and further to the east exposures of the concretions (characteristically 
iron-stained)  are  overlain  by  several  metres  of  undisrupted  clay.  Above  the  F  zone 
concretions is a red-stained layer, weakly cemented in places, visible in two exposures in 
the vicinity of Sea Road (Fig. 2.12a,c), and then the G zone, or shelly band.  
 
The  G  zone  comprises  a  very  densely-packed  assemblage  of  shells,  in  places  well-
cemented. This band varies in thickness, and also appears to vary in height above the F 
zone nodular layer. A recent exposure of c40cm thickness at 422120E 93233N (under 
Naish  Farm  at  the  western  extremity  of  the  F  plane  exposure)  has  been  reported  by 
Barton (2007) as being 3m above the concretionary ironstone layer, whilst Burton (1929) 
describes the G zone as only 5 ft (1.5m) above the concretions. On a site visit in June 
2007 another exposure about 50m west of Tom’s Garden (Fig. 1.2) reveals an indurated 
shelly band of 20-30mm thickness 3.35m above the concretion layer (Figs. 2.8, 2.9). It is 
possible that the shelly band, and the various smaller shelly lenses in the upper F zone, 
have  derived  from  a  series  of  floods  and  winnowing  causing  shell  accumulations  in 
pockets over a period of millennia, and therefore the band is not a good stratigraphic 
marker in itself, and may not be continuous throughout the Barton cliffs.  
 
2.2.  Process of Instability 
 
Attack on the cliffs comes from two directions. Water percolating through the permeable 
upper strata will accumulate on less-permeable layers (such as at the Barton Sand/Clay 
boundary  in the  Chama bed),  and  if  it  cannot  drain  efficiently  this  will  elevate  pore 
pressures in the underlying clay, destabilising steep slopes. At the same time erosion of   9 
the beach and undercliff oversteepens the cliff and reduces the frictional margin of safety. 
Steepening of the average cliff slope from 13.3° in 1947 to 18.8° in 1976 correlates with 
beach depletion following construction of the Hengistbury Head terminal groyne in 1938 
(Barton & Coles 1984).  
 
Beach depletion allows wave action to attack the landslide toes. The fine-grained bench 
rubble is then disaggregated and dispersed, unloading the bench back scars and leading to 
further slumping. The dip alongshore leads to successive preference of slide planes – A3 
predominates in the far west of the complex (Fig. 2.2), D through the complex centre and 
(it has formerly been reported) F1/F2 in the east. Barton & Coles (1984) report that the D 
bench rubble amounts to 79% of the entire colluvium in the landslide complex at Naish 
Farm. 
 
The  most  significant  mode  of  failure  (up  to  93%  of  instability-related  movement)  is 
slumping  with  associated  bench  sliding,  with  debris  slides,  mud  slides  and  spalling 
forming  important  but  lesser  mechanisms  (Barton  &  Coles  1984).  This  differs  from 
Brunsden  &  Jones’  (1976)  mechanism  for  the  largely  mudslide-driven  failures  on 
Stonebarrow  Hill,  Dorset,  and  from  Bromhead’s  (1979) simple  single deep  rotational 
failure  mechanism  reported  for  the  Miramar  slide  in  the  more  homogeneous  London 
Clay, although both these locations share with Barton-on-Sea the general pattern of a 
low-permeability weak clay or mudstone overlain by a coarser sediment allowing high 
levels  of  water  infiltration.  Slumping  and  bench  sliding  retains  the  integrity  of  large 
blocks of semi-intact material within the slide, and often identifiable portions of back-
tilted former ground surface remain long after the slump (Fig. 2.4). 
 
2.3.  The F1/F2 Boundary 
 
The nature of the weakness at the identified slide planes has been discussed by Barton 
and others, particularly in Barton et al (2006) for the D plane. Various hypotheses have 
been  put  forward  concerning  the  apparent  preference  for  sliding  above  concretionary 
layers including in Moore (1993), where it is considered that strain is concentrated at the   10 
nodular  layer  producing  a  failure  surface  as  a  stress  relief  feature.  Whilst  this  may 
contribute to focussing strain at these horizons, in the case of the F1/F2 boundary there 
may  be  another,  more  significant  reason.  Where  the  F  zone  nodules  are  exposed, 
particularly  east  of  Naish  Farm,  the concretion  layer is  an  apparently  well-cemented, 
continuous  hard  band  and  as  such  would  exhibit  even  lower  permeability  than  the 
surrounding clay. Even where joints and fractures exist they would be naturally grouted 
with clay from the strata above. In this the F zone concretions differ from those at the top 
of  the  C  zone,  which  are  distinctly  separate,  nodular  units  sitting  in  a  clay  matrix. 
Groundwater moving in fissures within the clay will seek the shortest route downhill, and 
when this route is barred by a less permeable layer natural lateral dewatering will take 
place along seepage horizons. It is postulated that the presence of these seepage horizons 
causes  a  weakening  in  the  intact  clay  structure  which,  when  triggered  by  excessive 
loading within the clay leads to the association of concretionary layers and failure planes. 
 
2.4.  Field Investigations 
 
During  a  site  visit  in  July  2007  there  was  no  evidence  of  a  functioning  slide  plane 
between the F zone concretionary layer and the shelly band in the exposure 50m west of 
Tom’s Garden (Figs. 2.10, 2.12b), but there are many small shelly lenses in the intact 
fissured  clay  which  overlies  the  concretions  at  this  point.  90-110mm  above  the 
concretionary layer is a 20-30mm thick shelly seam which was seen to form a soft, wet 
seepage horizon on inspection in August 2007 (Fig. 2.12b).  
 
Although there was no apparent movement along this horizon the softer, weaker structure 
when compared to the clay both above and below indicates this could be an incipient 
slide plane, and its stratigraphic relationship to the F zone concretions implies that this 
could be the same layer which forms the F1/F2 slide boundary further to the west (Barton 
pers. comm. 2007).  
 
A  slump  alongside  the  middle  access  path  just  below  Sea  Road  at  (423406.470E, 
92947.731N, elevation to top of concretions 13.517m AODN) has exposed 18m of the in-  11 
situ concretion layer (Figs. 2.11, 2.12c), although the shelly band is not exposed here. 
The  concretions  here  form  a  continuous  orange-stained  layer  275mm  deep,  with  a 
relatively level top surface, overlain by 1.4m of stiff, fissured in-situ clay up to the level 
of the path, above which regrading has removed both colluvium and in-situ material. 
280mm  above  the  concretions  is  a  140mm-thick  reddened  (rusty)  band  of  clay,  and 
locally there is slumping of colluvium including gravel, path fill material and silty sand 
into the otherwise-intact clay. 
 
A further exposure can be observed in the gulley bordering the eastern side of the Cliff 
House Hotel slide (at 423341.131E, 92969.320N, elevation to top of concretions 14.217m 
AODN), where the stream draining the Cliff House Hotel spring has eroded into the clay. 
Here  the  rusty  band  observed  at  Sea  Road  is  130mm  thick,  weakly  cemented  and 
overlays the concretionary layer by 190mm. The clay is truncated just above the rusty 
layer at this point (Fig. 2.12a). 
 
2.5.  Interpretation of Fieldwork 
 
Why movement does not seem to have become established directly above the F zone 
concretions  in  the  vicinity  of  Tom’s  Garden  could  be  due  to  the  greater  instability 
observed higher up at the Barton Sand/Clay boundary – slumping of  material at this 
higher plane (within the bottom 1m of the H zone) could reduce the surcharge on the 
F1/F2 boundary sufficiently to permit a limited stability despite the weakness represented 
by  the  seepage  horizon.  At  the  Tom’s  Garden  exposure  (surveyed  as  423039.991E, 
93063.095N, elevation to top of concretions 18.461m AODN) the indurated shelly band 
is  overlain  by  a  further  180mm  of  stiff  clay,  showing  evidence  of  bioturbation  and 
including a number of rusty sandy lenses in the upper 100mm, before being abruptly 
superceded by a near-white silty sand, which is believed to be the intact ‘H’ zone sand 
(Fig. 2.12b), although Burton (1929) indicates a thicker clay layer. At this location the 
sand layer is quickly overlain by disrupted colluvium, suggesting the main upper slide 
plane in this area is around the Sand/Clay boundary in the H zone, and not at the F1/F2 
boundary.   12 
It is suggested that, although there is clear evidence of an F zone slide plane under Naish 
Farm, the weakness in this particular stratum may be discontinuous, and the major planes 
of weakness in the upper bench may instead be in the H zone, where sandy lenses allow 
water to flow out of the cliff more readily (Barton pers. comm.2007).  
 
The  significance  of  the  weakness  existing  in  the  H  zone  is  that  failure  may  occur 
erratically  around  particular  sandy  lenses,  rather  than  at  a  clearly-defined  continuous 
weak stratum as seen at the base of the D zone, or at the westernmost exposure of the 
F1/F2 boundary.  
 
 
Fig. 2.1 Geological solid 
rock map of Christchurch 
Bay area, including 
Barton-on-Sea. Excerpt 
from BGS 1:250,000 
solid geology map of the 
Hampshire Basin, with 
key. (British Geological 
Society, C/O National 
Oceanographic Library)   13 
 
Fig. 2.2 Geological section along cliffs [www.soton.ac.uk/~imw] 
       
Fig. 2.3  Sketch of mode of failure in the Barton Clay, with in-situ clay failing along     Fig. 2.4 The result of a medium-large slump with distinct  
a ‘preferred seam’ of weaker material, and producing a ‘bench’ of colluvial rubble,      back-tilting of blocks as they settle onto the bench below.  
backed by an exposed failure scarp. After this landform is produced by slumping,       The upper cliff is approximately 4m in height (from Barton et  
the scarp is progressively obscured by spalling (from Barton et al 2006).                   al 1983).   14 
 
 
Fig. 2.5 (above) View to west from the end of the F zone outcrop showing the D bench with ponds 
and slumping below the Plateau Gravel cliff tops under Naish Farm. The stabilised cliff at 
Highcliffe is in the distance, beyond the mouth of Chewton Bunny with its three ‘strongpoint’ 
groynes marking the termination of the Highcliffe beach stabilisation scheme. June 2007 
Fig. 2.6 (below) D slip zone marked by the dark line descending from upper left (marked by 
arrow), with a C zone nodular concretion (about 0.5m across top-to-bottom) on the lower right.  
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Fig. 2.7 (above) F zone nodules exposed at the western end of the F2 zone bench, under Naish 
Farm. The near-vertical scarp above is in the Plateau Gravels, whilst the grey colluvium below 
sits on the D zone bench obscuring the lower portion of the F zone scarp. June 2007 
                                                       
        
Fig.2.8 (left) : G ‘shelly’ zone 
(pale band near bottom right) 
with isolated sandy lenses in the 
H zone above – exposure under 
Naish Farm. The nodular layer is 
3m below this point.   16 
 
 
Fig. 2.9 (above) Thin, poorly-cemented shelly band just west of the Cliff House Hotel landslide 
area, 3.35m above the ironstone concretions (at site of Fig. 2.12b). 
Fig. 2.10 Exposure of F zone concretions 50m W of Tom’s Garden. The layer (arrowed) is in-situ 
and exposed for c10m to left, but slumped and disrupted to the right of the hammer.  A stream 
draining one  of many  ponds on this bench has followed the line of the slump backscar. The 
concretions are more nodular here with an undulating top surface as compared to the site in Fig. 
2.11, but appear to be still continuous. 
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Fig.  2.11  Exposure  of  the  F  zone  concretionary  layer  below  Sea  Road.  The  exposure  is 
approximately 18m E-W and has been revealed by a slump in the face of the reprofiled slope 
below the middle access path. The path is immediately above the bare clay slope and in front of 
the boulders just visible in the top left of the picture. August 2007. 
Fig. 2.12 (below and next 2 pages) Logs of the exposures observed (a) below Cliff House Hotel, 
(b) 50m west of Tom’s Garden and (c) under Sea Road, during site inspections in August 2007. 
(a)    18 
(b)    19 
(c)    20 
3. History of the Stabilisation Works 
 
3.1.  Proposals 
 
Stabilisation work has been undertaken along much of the Christchurch Bay coastline. To 
the west of Chewton Bunny, along the Highcliffe cliffs, slope regrading and revegetation 
was  carried  out  in  stages  between  1970  and  1985  (Bray  &  Hooke  1998)  behind  a 
revetment and series of rock groynes (‘strongpoints’) constructed to protect the toe of the 
cliff. This has been largely effective, but has obscured the exposures of the lower Barton 
clay strata – now the top of the A3 band is the lowest stratum visible, immediately east of 
Chewton Bunny.  
 
In 1960 Sir William Halcrow and Partners reported to then local authority Lymington 
Borough Council on possible stabilisation works at the Barton-on-Sea frontage, offering 
two alternative schemes. The first of these was to construct a series of filter wells inland 
from the cliff face, and carry out ongoing pumped dewatering – a version of this idea 
involving just two wells had been proposed in 1936 by Colonel Craster (New Milton 
Advertiser 7
th March 1936) – but the proposal was rejected on the grounds of inducing 
possible subsidence in properties near the seafront. Later tests (Halcrow 1965) showed 
the capacity of the clay to withhold water would have demanded an unacceptably large 
number of boreholes be drilled and pumped in any case. 
 
The  second  proposal,  commissioned  in  1964-6,  involved  construction  of  a  4,850  ft 
(1500m)  continuous  sheet-pile  wall  within  the  undercliff  between  the  eastern  end  of 
Naish Farm and the Barton golf course (Halcrow 1961; Fig. 1.2). The wall was to be 70 ft 
(21.5m) from the cliff face, driven through the colluvium into the in-situ clay, with a 
porous interceptor drain to landward, and a series of non-porous pipe drains to evacuate 
collected  water  under  the  wall  and  out  to  sea  via  catch-pits  at  the  top  of  the  beach 
(Halcrow 1961). Manholes were located at the landward end of each pipe drain, and were 
initially numbered from west to east (starting with MH7). The proposal envisaged the 
diversion of water influx to the undercliff, together with groynes to retain beach material   21 
and limit seaward erosion would allow the colluvium to stabilise and form a support for 
the  sheet  piling  (Halcrow  1960).  Prior  to  construction  Halcrow  (1961)  expressed 
themselves as satisfied with the supply of shingle and it was believed the few pre-existing 
groynes would retain sufficient material to stabilise the toe of the degraded landslide. 
However,  Moore  (1993)  writes  that  the  construction  of  Hengistbury  Head  terminal 
groyne in 1938 was already known to be causing a deficit in longshore sediment transport 
significantly prior to 1960. 
 
3.2.  Construction of the Trial Phase 
 
A 1000 ft (310m) trial length of the cut-off drain and wall were constructed by Tarmac 
Construction Ltd in May to September 1964 (Halcrow 1965). Halcrow (1965) describe 
the trial works thus: 
 
“For approximately two-thirds of the trench (A-B, see Figure 1 on Drawing 64-1780), the 
drain was set at a level of 8 feet (2.45m) above the Barton Clay with a line of sheet-piling 
immediately seawards of the drain to prevent seepage from below the level of the drain. 
For the other section (B-C, see Figure 1 on Drawing 64-1780), the drain was set close to 
the  sand/clay  interface  and  all  piling  used  in  the  excavation  of  the  trench  was 
subsequently withdrawn”.  
 
Unfortunately  searches  at  Halcrow,  Tarmac  and  NFDC  have  been  unable  to  locate 
drawing  64-1780  mentioned,  but  later  drawing  67-2678  (NFDC  archive)  reveals 
‘drainage works stage 1’ as lying between ‘Point Q’ (Manhole 14, at 423717E, 92923E, 
near the foot of Hoskins Gap) and ‘Point S’ underneath the car park east of Fisherman’s 
Walk. It was in this area that the first major failure of the drain and wall took place, in 
1974 (Fig. 1.3). Halcrow (1978b) state that the revetment was also omitted from this trial 
section, although three outfalls and four groynes (possibly nos. 15-18) were included. A 
later version of drawing 67-2678, showing the works as completed in 1971, is reproduced 
in Fig. 3.1.   22 
Quite  why  the  drain  was  not  designed  to  serve  the  sand/clay  interface  throughout  is 
unclear – Halcrow (1978b) report tests made in 1970 showing movement at the base of 
the  ‘Chama  silts’  (believed  to  be  the  H  zone  sand/clay  boundary)  5m  below  ground 
surface. Installing the drain at only 10 – 12 ft (3 – 3.7m) depth would appear to still allow 
substantial volumes of undrained groundwater to accumulate on this boundary, below the 
drain and behind the wall.  
 
Halcrow drawing 67-2931 (see also BS2/49, updated to 1970, shown in Fig. 3.2) shows 
the top and bottom of the sheet pile, together with the sand/clay boundary observed in a 
series  of  nine  boreholes  between  MH10  (Sea  Road)  and  MH23  (the  eastern  end  of 
works). The piling is driven to between 4 and 6ft (1.23 – 1.85m) below the observed top 
of  the  clay,  however,  as  noted  later,  it  is  difficult  to  tell  in-situ  clay  from  disrupted 
colluvium in a small borehole sample. Additionally the clay in the lowest part of the 
Chama beds (the H zone) contains sandy and shelly lenses which increase permeability. 
These depths will be plotted together with data derived from more recent boreholes and 
exposures later in this report (Fig. 5.11). 
 
3.3.  Issues Following Construction 
 
Problems arose during construction of the trial section of sheet-piling as the ground to 
landward  quickly  became  waterlogged  before  the  drainage  system  had  been  properly 
installed (Halcrow 1965). The wall was emplaced further from the cliff face than the 
optimum design envisaged as property boundaries existed within the undercliff, dating 
back to before the cliff erosion had proceeded so far, and works permission could not be 
obtained from the owners. This also led to the regraded undercliff seaward of the wall 
being close to its limit of stability (Halcrow 1965). 
 
The design called for the regular spacing of the pipe drains under the wall, to optimise the 
evacuation of water from the upper undercliff (Fig. 3.1). However, these drains ignored 
pre-existing drainage channels that had developed in the colluvium below springs in the 
cliff face, and consequently did not correspond to areas where the clay may already have   23 
been  softened  by  the  presence  of  surface  water.  The  design  had  assumed  that  the 
colluvium downslope of the wall would dry out and provide a uniform support to the wall 
(Halcrow 1965, 1978b), so the positioning issue was considered irrelevant. It has been 
suggested that this may have aided the further build-up of pore pressure behind the wall 
(Moxey pers. comm. 2007).  
 
Boreholes  installed  to  monitor  ground-water  levels  inland  of  the  wall  showed  a 
drawdown  only  in  a  very  close  proximity  (‘a  few  feet’  –  Halcrow  1965)  from  the 
drainage  trench  behind  the  wall,  and  ground-water  levels  within  the  colluvium  were 
reported  as  at  ‘a  new  virtually  constant  level’  (Halcrow  1965)  of  3m  below  surface 
(Halcrow 1978b). The spacing of the groynes was also found to be inadequate (Halcrow 
1965). As early as October 1968, the first winter after completion of the full 1500m 
length of works, it was reported that £7,500 of repairs was necessary following a ‘silt slip 
between two outfalls’, possibly along a former drainage gulley course, at Barton (New 
Milton  Advertiser  2
nd  Nov.  1968).  This  occurred  towards  the  end  of  two  months  of 
relatively  high  rainfall,  the  first  of  these  exceeding  125mm  (Appendix  1  -  see  also 
Section 7 for ‘trigger’ rainfall values).  
 
The deeper section of drainage trench, where the sheet-piling had been removed, was 
reported to collect ‘rather less water per unit length than the shallower trench with the 
sheet-piling left in place’ (Halcrow 1965). Halcrow (1965) concluded by recommending 
the shallow drain and sheet-piling be utilised for the entire Barton cliff section. Halcrow 
drawing BS2/49 of 1970 (Fig. 3.2) shows the depth of sheet-piling throughout the entire 
defended section, as constructed. There does not appear to be any piling between MH16 
and MH17, but the ground surface and drain drop sharply to a lower outfall at MH16a, 
and the illustration includes the comment ‘Reconstructed March 1970’. On drawing 67-
2931 (an earlier version of BS2/49) this dip and additional outfall are absent, and the 
ground surface is 10ft (3m) above the level of MH16a. This indicates a failure in this area 
shortly after completion of the drainage system. Halcrow (1978b), referring to the 1974 
failure in this area, reported that the steel sheet piling had deformed over a 200m length 
before a breach occurred, and this suggests the wall was continuous by the date of failure.   24 
If it had not been, as Barton (pers. comm. 2007) points out, emplacement of the piling in 
the first place will have disrupted the colluvium and in-situ clay, and its removal will 
have left a weakness which could be exploited by groundwater ingress. 
 
A maintenance programme was established to remove accumulated clay and silt from the 
drainage system manholes on an approximately monthly basis, supported by a twice-
yearly inspection by Halcrow staff (Moxey pers. comm. 2007, Halcrow 1978b). Once it 
became apparent that the beach was providing insufficient toe support for the undercliff a 
flexible  timber  revetment  backed  by  angular  rock  boulders,  concrete  tripods,  extra 
groynes and slope regrading was added in 1965-8 (Bray & Hooke 1998).  
 
3.4.  Strongpoints 
 
In 1972 the first rock groyne ‘strongpoint’ was constructed, around the former Groyne 10 
at the western end of the 1967/8 defended section (Halcrow 1978b). This was designed to 
more effectively arrest shingle flow alongshore and prograde the beach below the area 
later  known  as  Tom’s  Garden,  where  the  sheet-pile  wall  ended  at  a  point  originally 
recorded as Manhole MH7 (Fig. 3.1). The outfall pipe from MH7 was 105ft (32.3m) west 
of Groyne 10 at the western end of the revetment (Halcrow drawing 67-1856, NFDC 
archive)  and  was  protected  initially  by  rockfill  and  concrete  tripod  units.  Slips  are 
recorded  in  this  area  from  completion  of  the wall in  1968  and  the  initial  siting  of  a 
strongpoint here was an attempt to stabilise this end of the works after the plan to extend 
the cut-off drain and wall to Chewton Bunny (Halcrow 1969, see also Section 3.5 below) 
was abandoned.  
 
By 1973 a carpet of shingle was covering the exposed clay west of the strongpoint and 
producing a shallower beach (Halcrow 1978b). Further strongpoints were added in 1975 
(groynes 18 and 22), and later at the Barton terminal groyne, no. 25, and at groynes 12 
and 15. 
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3.5.  Further Developments 
 
Halcrow (1969) had proposed an extension of the original sheet-pile wall under Naish 
Farm, to provide a continuous defended stretch from Chewton Bunny to Barton Golf 
Club,  but  this  was  rejected  on  both  financial  and  environmental  grounds  (Halcrow 
1978b). Due to the geological importance of the Barton cliffs, and the lack of permanent 
structures above the cliffs (the cliff top is home to a caravan and chalet park) this area 
was allowed to continue to degrade, although there has been considerable discussion as to 
the extent to which environmental, scientific and social interests can best be served by 
limited protection (Barton 1998). A consequence of the abandonment of the Naish Farm 
defence scheme was a relatively unprotected western end to the Barton defences, which 
would contribute to instability in the Tom’s Garden area for many years (Fig. 1.3, also 
see Section 4). 
 
Despite the construction of the groyne field and revetment, the beach continued to lose 
sediment and many groynes were bypassed by shingle going around, through or under the 
wooden panels (Curry pers. comm. 2007, Halcrow 1978b). This led to further unloading 
of the undercliff toe. In addition to the construction of strongpoints shingle renourishment 
of the beach was commenced in 1976 towards the eastern end of the Barton frontage. 
 
Where  the  drainage  system  was  repaired  the  granular  filter  was  augmented  with  a 
permeable polypropylene membrane to limit the amount of silt and clay ‘choking’ the 
drain during mudslides. Drain choking had been found to be a factor in the 1974 failure. 
 
3.6.  Continued Instability 
 
The maximum water flows out of the cliff had significantly exceeded the design capacity 
of the interceptor drain, and ponds on the bench landward of the sheet pile wall, which 
had originally been pumped out to reduce pressure on the wall, began to accumulate 
water  again  (Moxey  pers.  comm.  2007).  The  greater-than-design  width  of  undercliff 
behind the wall also allowed a greater accumulation of water than was anticipated.    26 
The area around Cliff House Hotel continued to give cause for concern, and in winter 
1973/4  Halcrow  (1974a)  reported  seaward  movement  of  the  revetment  between 
Strongpoint 10 and Groyne 11 (Fig. 3.3), with the slip progressing all the way upslope to 
the line of the sheet-piling. The lower slope was reported to be bulging and the toe wall 
moved, but the revetment remained intact. 
 
3.7.  The November 1974 Failure at Barton Court / Fisherman’s Walk 
 
This is a brief summary of the first major failure of the Barton-on-Sea cliff drainage 
system, included to illustrate similarities with the main areas of this study. Barton Court 
is located on the cliff directly above the Inclinometer I4 (Figs. 1.2, 1.3).  
 
Rupturing of the pipe drains and fracturing of the sheet-piling caused by small ongoing 
movement in the undercliff, probably founded on the Sand/Clay boundary, led to the 
seepage of groundwater into the colluvium downslope of the wall. This compromised the 
design requirement that the wall be supported by the colluvium (Halcrow 1978b). Very 
heavy rainfall had been observed in early November 1974 (375.7mm over Sept – Nov 
1974 at Hurn), following several relatively dry years (Appendix 1). 
 
Two emergency inspections were carried out by Halcrow (1974b,c) on 13
th and 15
th. The 
first reported ‘deterioration … appeared to be due to saturation of the ground and … was 
also aggravated by the uncontrolled drainage caused by the movement earlier this year’ 
(Halcrow  1974b).  Grabens  opened  landward  of  the  drainage  trench/sheet-pile  wall 
between Groynes 16 (foot of Hoskins Gap) and 19 (357m to the east), with maxima at 
MH16 directly under Barton Court (4m seaward movement of the wall) and at the foot of 
Fishermans  Walk,  where  ‘total  horizontal  movement  here  might  be  about  10m  but 
probably only half occurred in the last two days’ (Halcrow 1974c). Between these two 
maxima  the  revetment  was  being  flattened  by  movement  of  the  rock  armour  placed 
behind it. It was reported that no seepage of water through the sheet-piling was apparent, 
although ponding was occurring to landward in the developing grabens. Groynes 16-18 
were being under-run so were not providing any beach to support the slide toe, and at the   27 
points of maximum displacement the sheet-piling was leaning at up to 30° from vertical 
(Halcrow 1974c). Halcrow (1974c) includes the odd comment (in view of the movement, 
grabens and ponding, the statement about ‘uncontrolled drainage’ in Halcrow 1974b and 
the observation in Halcrow 1974c that the depth of water in MH17 had risen from 2ft to 
4ft)  that  ‘sheet  piling  …  still  provides  an  effective  barrier  with  no  evidence  of 
unacceptable general raising of water table behind’.  
 
Rapid seaward movement of the sheet-piling along a 200m frontage commenced around 
17
th November 1974 (Clark et al 1976). The sheet-pile wall at Barton Court continued to 
bow seawards, reaching 15m displacement and breaching on 27
th. This led to progressive 
cliff-top recession of up to 10m which continued into April 1975 (Clark et al 1976, Bray 
& Hooke 1998). Mudslides accompanying the failure flattened the revetment (Fig. 3.4) 
and pushed a tongue of dislocated material up to 25m seaward of the former shoreline.  
 
The breach was attributed to ‘deep-seated failures’ (Halcrow 1978b). If the F1/F2 slide 
plane is discontinuous, and the upper bench formed on the Sand/Clay boundary, then the 
1974/5  Barton  Court  slide  may  not  be  as  deep-seated  as  originally  believed.  The 
observation that the sheet-piling was significantly displaced from the vertical indicates 
the higher material behind the revetment has advanced further than the material below it. 
This implies additional weight near the surface, which could be due to the heavy rainfall 
ponding  in  the  colluvium,  rather  than  deep-seated  sliding  which  would  translate  the 
revetment base and maintain a more vertical aspect. This will be discussed further in a 
comparison of the failure modes at Cliff House Hotel and Hoskins Gap West.  
 
Manhole flow rates were reported as ‘normal’ in Halcrow (1974c), with no evidence of 
silting-up or blockage, yet the high rainfall, ponding and high standing water level in 
MH17 all indicate a near-surface build-up of water unable to drain satisfactorily. This 
water then fuelled the mudslides that led to the ‘leaning’ and breaching of the wall.  
 
Following the 1974/5 slide the sheet-piling and drainage system was reinstated, but with 
a curve to seaward below the Beachcomber Café (Dunn pers. comm. 2007, Fig. 3.5).   28 
 
Fig. 3.1 Original positions of the cut-off drain, manholes, revetment and groynes along the western Barton-on-Sea frontage, with the addition of the 
first strongpoint at groyne 10. Inclinometer positions from 1995 are included for easy comparison with Fig. 1.2. Halcrow drawing BS2/48, April 
1971   29 
 
Fig. 3.2 Longshore profile of the cut-off drain with manholes indicated, from Halcrow drawing BS2/49 of June 1970. This drawing indicates the 
extent of the 1964/5 experimental section under Barton Court and also shows the depth of the sheet pile and of the drain to landward of it. Refer to 
Fig. 3.1 for locations of the manholes at construction. Note the numbering system changed after Halcrow involvement ceased, with MH15 retaining 
its old number but other numbers reversing so that the sequence increased from east to west.   30 
 
 
Fig. 3.3 (above) View of damaged revetment being pushed out by toe of landslide under Cliff 
House Hotel, 18
th March 1974. (NFDC archive) 
Fig. 3.4 (below) The original 1960s timber revetment and groynes below Fisherman’s Walk 
following failure in 1974/5 (NFDC archive 1977) 
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Fig. 3.5 (above) The 1974/5 failure under Barton Court Hotel was followed by a full reinstatement 
of the sheet-pile wall but with a distinct curve in the roadway.  
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4. The Cliff House Hotel landslide 
 
4.1.  The Development of Instability at Tom’s Garden in 1974-91 
 
There continued to be evidence of instability in the area around Tom’s Garden and under 
Cliff House Hotel after the reports mentioned in Section 3.6 (Fig. 1.3). A photograph 
dated June 1977 shows a disrupted, partially exposed length of piling (Fig. 4.1). In May 
1978 Halcrow (1978a) report ‘recent movement’ around the access road (in the area later 
to  form  the  apex  of  the  surface  drain  fan)  but  no  seepage  under  the  ‘sheet-piled 
revetment’. There was very little shingle on the beach. An aerial photograph taken the 
previous month (Fig. 4.2b) shows a lack of vegetation indicating landslides near MH7 
and seaward of the sheet-piling between MH8 and MH9. There is some bulging of the 
revetment in this area, and a mudslide has disrupted the lower part of the access road 
west of the strongpoint. 
 
By the following spring (Halcrow 1979) extensive sliding under Naish Farm had affected 
Manhole  MH7  and  the  western  end  of  the  sheet-piling,  which  had  moved  seaward. 
Groundwater was observed ponding landward of strongpoint 10. The outfall drain from 
MH7 had been relaid and two counterfort drains had been inserted. 
 
Movement at  MH7 and the western end of the piling continued, and in March 1981 
Halcrow (1981a) stated: “it must be anticipated that this length of piling, some 30m to 
40m, will  fail completely in  the  near  future.”  Around  1500m
2  of  ground around  this 
location was recorded as ‘completely disrupted’ during this survey (Fig. 4.2) and MH7 
was  observed  6m  to  seaward  of  its  original  position.  The  access  road  (immediately 
seaward of the western slip area in Fig. 4.3) had been partially blocked by mudsliding on 
a number of occasions. A similar-sized area seaward of MH8 was showing evidence of 
instability, with the edge of the upper access track moved 3m seaward and subsided by up 
to  0.75m.  A  high  water  inflow  rate  was  recorded  in  MH8,  but  the  outfall  pipe  was 
thought  to  be  damaged  by  the  slide.  Investigating  the  possibility  that  this  water  was 
discharging into the colluvium was given top priority in the recommendations of Halcrow   33 
(1981a). The slip was not recorded as affecting the revetment to a great extent, although 
some bulging had been noticed near Groyne 11. 
 
Six  months  later  MH7  was  noted  as  being  ‘precariously  perched’  above  a  virtually 
continuous  mudslide  which  was  steadily  eroding  around  the  end  of  the  sheet-piling 
(Halcrow  1981b)  and  frequently  blocking  the  access  road.  The  road  had  also  been 
damaged in the area of the MH8 failure, which had considerably enlarged in area (Fig. 
4.3) and now reached from the sheet-piling to the revetment. The berm of this slip area 
had been rebuilt using a base of brick and building rubble, and further rubble, rock and 
shingle was being employed as toe weighting to help stabilise this area. 
 
It has not been possible to locate further biannual inspection reports from Halcrow after 
the end of 1981, although plans made to accompany the May 1982 inspection were used 
in creating Fig. 4.3, and a plan (Halcrow drawing BSD/110 of December 1982) exists of 
works to restore MH7 (Fig. 4.4).   
 
In May 1986 (Fig. 4.2c) the Tom’s Garden area remained unvegetated and still appeared 
to be sliding seaward and down-dip towards the strongpoint. The beach was prograding 
west  of  the  strongpoint,  possibly  from  deposition of  sandy  material  in  the  colluvium 
being  transported  by  mudslides.  Three  years  later  (Fig.  4.2d)  the  revetment  between 
groynes 11 and 12, east of the strongpoint, had been strengthened with rockfill and the 
beach was still prograding. 
 
Works to stabilise the western end of the sheet-piling finally culminated in the distinctive 
fan-shaped system of rock-filled surface drains in the Tom’s Garden area, seen in the 
aerial photograph of 17
th June 1990 (Fig. 4.2e). At the same time the area between the 
MH8 outfall and groyne 12 was largely covered with rockfill and building rubble, the 
slope  regraded,  the  revetment  enhanced  and  groyne  11  virtually  buried  within  the 
revetment. From the strongpoint to just east of groyne 12 the shoreline developed a bulge 
of around 10m to seaward (Fig. 4.5). 
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4.2.  Cliff House Hotel – Failures in the Period 1992 – 1995 
 
A significant slip took place within the undercliff at Cliff House Hotel in the winter of 
1992-3 (New Milton Advertiser 25
th Sep. 1993). Following remedial works in Spring 
1993 a major failure occurred on 17
th December 1993 (Cross pers. comm.. 2007; Rendel 
Geotechnics 1994b). This resulted in a breach of the sheet-pile wall from west of the Sea 
Road access road westwards to Tom’s Garden. Sections of piling were separated and 
moved downslope and MH9 became displaced and settled in the centre of the collapsed 
zone (Fig. 4.2g). The failure followed a period of bulging of the shoreline (Figs. 4.2e, 4.5, 
4.6) and decrease in nearshore bathymetry as deep movements pushed material up under 
and beyond the beach (Cross pers. comm.. 2007). Following both these failures and the 
one on 13
th February 2001, a discolouration in the water off Barton-on-Sea was observed 
for a period approaching twelve months, as clay pushed up at the landslide toe, seaward 
of the beach, was entrained by the longshore current (Ferguson pers. comm..2007).  
 
Around the early 1990s activity large quantities of rockfill and building rubble had been 
placed on the surface of the slip toe. This included material left over from constructing 
the rock revetment for use in repairs (Dunn pers. comm. 2007; Fig. 4.2b-d) and also as 
toe  weighting  (Cross  pers.  comm..  2007).  Rendel  Geotechnics  (1994b)  reported  that 
construction of the new strongpoint 12 under Sea Road utilised some of this corestone 
placed behind the revetment and requested that this be replaced with urgency as removal 
of this material was expected to further destabilise the Cliff House Hotel slip area. The 
strongpoint (Fig. 4.6) was under construction at the time of the 17
th Dec. 1993 landslide, 
and the eastern boundary of the slide lined up with the centre of the strongpoint (Cross 
pers. comm. 2007; Dunn pers. comm. 2007). The  gulley that opened up to drain the 
spring under Cliff House Hotel at the time of the slide follows the eastern boundary of the 
disrupted  area  and  delivers  water  to  a  pond  just  landward  of  the  present-day  rock 
revetment a few metres east of this strongpoint (Figs. 4.6, 4.7). 
 
Writing at the onset of activity here, before the first major collapse of December 1993, 
Moore  (1993)  observed  that  the  mode  of  incipient  failure,  with  a  series  of  cracks   35 
describing a semi-circle surrounding the area later to fail across the entire width of the 
undercliff, had not previously been noted at Barton-on-Sea and did not correspond with 
the bench-sliding mode observed in the unprotected Naish Farm frontage to the west. 
 
Rainfall recorded at Hurn (Appendix 1; Table 6.1) in the four-month period preceding the 
1993 failure amounted to 572.4mm. Three years earlier (before construction of the Tom’s 
Garden surface drains) 562.7mm had been recorded over November 1989 to February 
1990, when no signs of instability were observed at Cliff House Hotel.  
 
4.3.  Repairs after the 1993 Failure 
 
Rendel Geotechnics (1994a) observed continuing slope movement at Cliff House Hotel, 
together with ‘much surface water’ over the failed slope in June 1994, the water deriving 
from the former drainage system behind the failed sheet-pile. Emergency drainage works 
were carried out between 7
th and 26
th October 1994 (Rendel Geotechnics 1994b), to drain 
water  pooling  in  a  graben  landward  of  Tom’s  Garden  and  intercept  a  large  spring 
emerging from the cliff under Cliff House Hotel. These drains utilised HDPE perforated 
pipe in a gravel surround, and sections of this piping are now exposed on the surface 
where they have been transported by further landsliding (Fig. 4.8). This area remains very 
boggy.  
 
Other works undertaken in 1994 included the reconstruction of an outfall pipe through 
the middle of the Cliff House Hotel landslide area, serving the damaged cut-off drainage 
system and additional counterfort and mole drains removing water directly from the cliff 
face (Rendel Geotechnics 1994c). During these works further cracking was noted on the 
upper bench, together with failure of around 40m of cliff top above Tom’s Garden. A 
new access road was constructed, linking the former footpath under the backscar at Sea 
Road with the surviving western end of the old access road. This roadway crossed the 
main area of the landslide higher in the undercliff than its predecessor (Fig. 4.2g). The 
following year Rendel Geotechnics (1995c) reported that the emergency works appeared 
to have stabilised the Cliff House Hotel area and the drains were functioning correctly.    36 
Despite the major failure at Cliff House Hotel the surface drains at Tom’s Garden appear 
to have performed satisfactorily, and successive aerial photographs through the 1990s 
(Fig. 4.2e-h) show vegetation becoming established here for the first time in many years, 
indicating stability. 
 
By Summer 1998 (Fig. 4.2h) severe cracking of the new upper access road landward of 
the original position of MH9 had become apparent. Ponds in the grabens at the foot of the 
Plateau Gravels backscar were draining into the eastern gulley and down to Strongpoint 
12, and this drainage was carrying the roadway with it. The Tom’s Garden surface drains 
were  showing  signs  of  slight  disruption  as  they  were  no  longer  as  straight  as  at 
installation, although the previous mudsliding had not resumed. The beach had continued 
to  prograde,  and  Fig.  4.2h,  photographed  at  low  tide,  shows  sand  beyond  the  tip  of 
Strongpoint 10, to the tip of Strongpoint 12.  
 
4.4.  Reactivation in 2001 
 
On 13
th February 2001 a large section of the cliff top immediately west of Sea Road 
detached and slumped into the area affected by the 1993 failure. This new landslide was 
constrained  loosely  by  the  boundaries  of  the  previous  activity  at  the  seaward  end, 
producing an even more pronounced bulge between Strongpoints 10 and 12, the centre of 
which reached a line drawn between the strongpoint tips (Fig. 4.2i). Within the undercliff 
the eastern limit of the slide was once again formed by the gulley above Strongpoint 12, 
although its upper section was cut back further eastwards than previously. The broken 
sheet-piling  from  the  1993  and  2001  slides  was  moved  between  10m  and  30m 
downslope, flattened and heavily distorted (Fig. 4.9), and a new NW-SE trending central 
gulley  opened  up  draining  the  area  behind  the  dislodged  position  of  former  MH8 
obliquely across the undercliff, downslope and downdip to Strongpoint 12. This gulley 
separated an elevated colluvium ‘island’ from the main landslide area (Figs. 4.2i-j, 4.10 – 
4.12 and Appendix 2 Profile L2).  
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The western end of the original cut-off drain system was completely disrupted, with the 
replacement  drain  and  manholes  broken  and  moved  downslope.  This  included  the 
manholes into which two of the three mole drain arrays (Section 4.7) fed, leaving only 
MH24A, feeding into the Tom’s Garden surface drains, functioning as designed. 
 
All roadways within the undercliff were severed, ground level falling by up to 5m where 
the roads were washed away. Although the main trend of the 2001 slide was towards 
Strongpoint 12 a substantial area on the western side failed towards Strongpoint 10, and 
this disrupted the edge of the Tom’s Garden system, with the easternmost drains and the 
rock  wall along  the  roadside  clearly  distorted  and slumped  to  seaward  (Fig.  4.2i).  A 
‘headland’ of the clifftop remained adjacent to Sea Road in Fig. 4.2i, but cracking is 
apparent from the photograph. After two months of metastability a further section of 
clifftop failed here (Figs. 4.2j, 4.13), and spalling has continued to erode the cliff since 
2001. The undercliff below the Plateau Gravel backscar has now achieved an average 1 
in 4 to 1 in 5 angle of repose (Appendix 2 Profiles L1, L2, L3), although the seaward 
slope of the colluvium ‘island’, still covered with rockfill and rubble (Fig. 4.2j) is a little 
steeper. 
 
There has been no attempt to restore the drains and roadway under Cliff House Hotel 
since the 2001 failures, and the area has returned to a more natural drainage regime. 
 
4.5.  Cross-Shore Profile Records of the 1992/3 and 2001 Landslides 
 
During 1993, and following the 17
th December slide a series of cross-shore profiles of the 
Cliff House Hotel area were taken, both across the revetment at the toe of the unstable 
area and also across the entire undercliff. These are reproduced in Appendix 2, and their 
locations are given on the map in Fig. 4.14.  
 
Five  transects  were  surveyed  in  October  1993  (C2,  L1  to  L4),  and  again  on  20
th 
December  1993  and  in  January  and  February  1994  and  July  1995.  Seven  additional 
profile lines (LX, LX1, LX2, L1A, L2A, L3A and L5) were surveyed immediately after   38 
the landslide and during the subsequent surveys (data kindly provided by John Cross, 
formerly of the University of Southampton Coastal Research Unit, from his archive). 
Profile lines L1, L2, L3 and L4 were re-surveyed by the Channel Coast Observatory in 
August 2007 for this project, to examine the extent of profile change brought about by the 
February 2001 landslide and the subsequent ‘settling’ episode in April 2001 (see Section 
4.4), and these are also shown on the plots in Appendix 2. 
 
To determine the elevation of strata within the undercliff area all existing borehole data 
and the three concretion exposures recorded in Fig. 2.12 have been interpolated along 
four transects, shown on Fig. 4.14 and in Table 4.1. The sand/clay boundary and the base 
of the D zone have been calculated based on the strata thicknesses in Burton (1929). 
 
4.6.  Clues to the Plane of Failure at Cliff House Hotel 
 
Slip  indicators  on  the  three  benches  below  Cliff  House  Hotel  in  1993  indicated 
movement at about -2m AODN (which correlates with Barton’s estimate of the D zone 
slide  plane  at  this  location  (Barton  pers.  comm..  2007)  and  at  about  +18m  AODN 
(correlating with the highest zone of displacement in Inclinometers 1 and 1A – Fig. 6.2), 
which Rendel Geotechnics (1993) ascribe to the F/G zone boundary. However, using 
Barton’s revision (pers. comm. 2007) of Burton’s (1929) vertical section of the Barton 
Beds the vertical distance from the base of the D zone to the base of the G zone is only 
15.2m.  
 
Using  Table  4.1,  the  top  of  the  F  zone  concretions  should  be  between  +15.9m  and 
+14.4m AODN along the upper roadway in the failure area, and at +14.3m AODN at 
position I1. This places the slide plane c3.4m above the F zone concretions, which is very 
close to the spacing between the concretions and the shell band observed 50m west of 
Tom’s Garden (Section 2.1; Fig. 2.12b). Fig. 3.2 indicates the depth of sheet-piling near 
Cliff House Hotel as 23ft 9in (7.3m). This gives an elevation for the bottom of the sheet-
pile at MH9 of 49ft 3in (+15.3m) AODN, which is above the position of the concretions   39 
(+14.9m  AODN,  Table  4.1  Upper  Transect  Line  L2),  but  is  below  the  slide  plane 
recorded by the slip indicators and inclinometers. This is displayed in Fig. 4.15. 
 
Also shown in Fig. 4.15 is the depth of the cut-off drain and the sand/clay boundary 
(derived from Table 4.1 and Burton (1929)). The drain is almost at the base of the Barton 
Sand at the western end of the sheet-piling, but becomes progressively shallower to the 
east. However, this assumes the Barton Clay is intact up into the Chama beds, and with 
the  extensive  mudsliding  observed  around  MH7  this  may  not  be  the  case  at  Tom’s 
Garden.  
 
Rendel Geotechnics (1993b) also observed movement at around +13m to +15m AODN 
under the upper access road, at the top of the Cliff House Hotel 1992/3 slip zone, with the 
greatest movement in the centre of the slip area. This level would be below the sheet-pile 
wall  and  at  about  the  F  zone  concretionary  layer  (Fig.  4.15).  However,  the  bulging 
revetment  and  evidence  of  deeper  movement  led  Rendel  Geotechnics  (1993b)  to 
conclude that the main slide plane affecting the Cliff House Hotel area was the D zone 
base plane, and hence failure in this area was predominantly deep-seated. Additionally 
the monthly cross-shore surveys recorded a rise in submarine ground level seaward of the 
beach, due to toe ‘heave’ and deep rotation (Cross pers. comm.. 2007), which would only 
occur if the slide was deep-seated.  
 
A further report from Rendel Geotechnics (1994a) stated that the deep-seated failure at 
Cliff  House  Hotel  was  unlikely to  extend  east of  Strongpoint  15 provided  that  coast 
protection works (the rock revetment) were extended east of this strongpoint to prevent 
scour. This is supported by the weak plane at the D zone base becoming too deep below 
sea level east of this point to be expected to function as a slide plane. Strongpoint 15 is 
located 70m west of Hoskins Gap and at this point the D slide plane will be at c-3.5m 
AODN. It is possible that the report intended to highlight instead Strongpoint 12, at Sea 
Road, where the C/D plane is between -2m AODN (Barton pers. comm. 2007) and -0.5m 
AODN (calculated from Burton 1929 and Table 4.1). Although there has been substantial 
landsliding near to Strongpoint 15 (see Section 5) the eastern edge of the Cliff House   40 
Hotel failure zone lines up with Strongpoint 12 (Fig. 4.6) and for 150m east of here the 
undercliff is remarkably stable (Fig. 4.16). 
 
4.7.  Mole Drains 
 
One  of  the  more  novel  improvements  to  the  drainage  system  at  Cliff  House  Hotel 
employed after the 1993 failure was the installation of three sets of mole drains (with a 
fourth set under Barton Court). These are perforated pipe drains with a curved profile, 
driven into the undercliff at a near-horizontal angle, then curved upwards behind the cliff 
face to emerge on the cliff top (Drury & Le Pen 1998).  
 
At the lower end they were connected into a reconstructed section of the pre-existing cut-
off drain system (Fig. 4.17). This entailed the drains being driven in fan-like arrays, in 
order  to  attain  relatively  equal  spacing  behind  the  cliff,  but  meeting  at  the  nearest 
appropriate manhole in the undercliff. Although this layout provided the best coverage 
behind the cliff face it was less evenly distributed in the undercliff. The westernmost 
array bypassed the repaired Halcrow cut-off drains and fed instead into the Tom’s Garden 
surface drains through new manhole MH24A. 
 
This scheme was experimental and previously untried when installed. The aim was to 
drain  water  in  the  Plateau  Gravels  and  sandier  upper  Barton  strata  before  it  could 
accumulate  within  the  Barton  Clay  and  raise  pore  pressures  to  dangerous  levels. 
However,  in  several  instances  pre-existing  property  boundaries  prevented  the  moles 
being driven to the optimum chosen extent, and the near-vertical section of the pipe was 
brought to surface within the undercliff. The perforations were also drilled by hand on-
site and were of an uneven distribution (Drury & Le Pen 1998).  
 
An extensive investigation into the performance of the mole drains, together with a slope 
stability analysis, was undertaken by Drury and Le Pen (1998) but they found limitations 
with the quality and extent of data available. The experimental nature of the installation 
also restricted the possibility of performance comparison. They highlighted a number of   41 
research areas for further investigation. In their analysis they determined that the vast 
majority of groundwater flow through the Barton cliffs catchment was being intercepted 
by the drainage system, but not necessarily soon enough to prevent slippage (mole (and 
horizontal) drains driven into the cliff are designed to achieve earlier interception). The 
mole drains were reported as covering 37% of the at-risk cliff area and being responsible 
for extracting 20% of the groundwater, but Drury & Le Pen (1998) concluded that, as the 
mole drains were designed to complement existing measures this was a positive result. 
 
4.8.  Field Observations 
 
During the site inspections of 10
th and 22
nd August 2007 the centre of the Cliff House 
Hotel landslide area was observed to be still extremely boggy, with this wet area draining 
mostly into the new  gulley landward of the ‘island’ (Fig. 4.18). The original eastern 
gulley has eroded to 5-6m depth, with in-situ material on its eastern flank and colluvium 
to its west, and continues to drain the Cliff House Hotel spring and the graben and bogs 
in the north-eastern part of the landslide. The steep slopes on the side of this gulley, 
particularly where this intersects the former upper access road around the broken end of 
the sheet-piling, may prove unstable after heavy rain, although little movement of the 
survey points here was observed following the high recorded rainfall in November 2002 
and November 2003 (Fig. 7.2). The central gulley forms a gentle slope from the upper 
grabens above Tom’s Garden to Strongpoint 12 and this may function as a conduit for 
shallow mudsliding in periods of heavy rain. Tom’s Garden is now densely vegetated and 
the  rock-filled  drains,  where  visible,  are  overgrown  and  uneven.  Much  of  the  area 
formerly  drained  by  them  now  drains  to  the  central  gulley.  The  ground  above  and 
landward  of  the  surface  drain  system  is  formed  of  detached,  slumped  and  backtilted 
sections of former clifftop and is uneven, but no fresh cracking was apparent. 
 
4.9.  Possible Mechanisms for the Cliff House Hotel Failures 
 
Cliff House Hotel landslide is probably the most complex of the Barton cliff failures, 
involving  seepage,  percolation  and  movement  through  several  inhomogeneous  in-situ   42 
layers  ranging  from  the  Plateau  Gravels  through  shelly,  sandy  and  silty  strata  to  the 
fissured Barton Clay, in addition to already-disrupted colluvium. The area was an active 
landslide zone before construction of the defences in 1967-8 and the extent to which the 
ground seaward of the cut-off drain and wall was already disrupted may not have been 
fully  investigated.  Whilst  this  report  draws  on  a  large  dataset  from  various  sources, 
knowledge  of  the  subsurface  strata,  preferred  groundwater  flow  paths  and  planes  of 
weakness  within  the  failure  zone  is  at  best  sketchy.  This  knowledge  can  only  be 
improved by installation of a series of inclinometers and piezometers at points in and 
around the failure zone, and possibly additionally by the use of fluoride or similar tracer 
compounds to monitor water flow.  
 
Furthermore, in researching reports from previous investigations carried out at the time of 
activity the author has identified several key periods for which little information has been 
available.  There  remain  gaps in  the  chronological  monitoring,  and  in  knowledge  and 
understanding of the first stage of activity at Cliff House Hotel in 1992, as well as no 
reports between 1982 and 1989. It is possible that, if these documents came to light, the 
interpretations  and  conclusions  drawn  in  this  report  would  be  revised  yet  further. 
Therefore this report can at best offer only a preliminary interpretation of the processes at 
work in the two main phases of activity, based on the information available at the time of 
compilation. 
 
The major failures at Cliff House Hotel occurred after the stabilisation of the western end 
with the surface drain array. The  mudsliding around MH7 had repeatedly eroded the 
surface area at the western end of the defended section and had disrupted the end of the 
sheet-piling, but all this activity appeared to be shallow-seated, and movement at Tom’s 
Garden  was  largely  eradicated  by  construction  of  the  surface  drains.  It  may  be 
coincidental  that  the  focus  of  activity  moved  following  this  work,  but  a  possible 
hypothetical link may follow this process: 
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1993 
•  Before  construction  of  the  surface  drains  mudsliding  down  to  the  sand/clay 
boundary was possible all around MH7 – ground landward of the wall could slump 
westwards around the end of the wall into the unprotected section. 
•  Construction of the surface drains and re-profiling of the slope at Tom’s Garden 
lowered the preference for westward-directed slumping. The sheet-piling had been 
much disrupted and pushed seawards over 23 years, leading to the opening-up of 
cracks behind the wall and below the original drain level, and groundwater drained 
into these cracks. 
•  Being below the drain system, the cracks could only drain into fissures in the clay 
below, increasing pore pressures down to the F zone concretions. Lateral drainage 
along  seepage  horizons  above  the  concretions  but  below  the  wall  conveyed 
pressured groundwater into the colluvium downslope of the wall. It is also possible 
that  the  F  zone  concretions  are  not  as  continuous  this  far  west  (note  the  more 
undulating, nodular surface observed in the exposure west of Tom’s Garden), or the 
joints in this band more open, allowing easier infiltration of groundwater to greater 
depths. 
•  Downward  percolation  through  fissures  in  the  colluvium  and  lower  clay  strata 
elevated pore pressures and increased lubrication on the D zone slide plane. 
•  The period of high rainfall in late 1993 led to infiltration greatly exceeding drainage 
within the failure zone, and the partial unloading of the landslide toe by contractors 
building  Strongpoint  12  reduced the  stability  of  the  area  even more,  leading  to 
failure. 
 
2001 
•  Although the drainage system was repaired after the 1993 failure it was ineffective 
at  draining  the  grabens  under  the  Plateau  Gravels  backscar  (the  manhole  flow 
survey in High-Point Rendel (1998c) reports very low flows (<5 litres/minute) in 
the manholes between the western edge of Tom’s Garden and the eastern boundary 
of the  1993 slide  area,  whilst  flows  in  the  manholes  around  Sea  Road are  c85 
litres/minute).    44 
•  The backscar had been partially unloaded by the 1993 failure, and the mole drains 
were mostly driven only a few metres into the cliff (largely within the 2001 failure 
zone) and were insufficient to withdraw water following the accumulated heavy 
rainfall of winter 2000-1.  
•  This high rainfall saturated the colluvium from the 1993 slide, re-elevating pore 
pressures down to the D base plane, at the same time as overloading the drainage 
capacity of the upper undercliff.  
•  The  unloaded,  oversaturated  Plateau  Gravel  backscar  failed,  and  the  mass  of 
collapsing gravel and clay propelled the 1993 colluvium forward on the D base 
plane. This failing mass drew in adjoining sections of undercliff to either side of the 
1993 slide limits. 
 
The  insufficient  depth  of  the  original  cut-off  drain,  and  the  sheet-piling  being  only 
founded in clay and not in the concretion layer, based on the flawed assumption that the 
(fissured)  clay  was  impermeable,  may  therefore  be  significant  design  flaws  that 
contributed to the nature of landslide reactivation at Cliff House Hotel. The unfortunate 
timing  of  the  removal  of  corestone  from  the  revetment  (Rendel  Geotechnics  1994b) 
coinciding with the high four-month rainfall of September to December 1993 is of equal 
if not greater importance. 
 
4.10.  Other Possible Mechanisms 
 
The possibility that the groundwater ingress to the D zone base plane in 1992/3 travelled 
down-dip from under Naish Farm is unlikely, given that the Tom’s Garden area remained 
stable after the 1990 works. 
 
A further theory for the position of the Cliff House Hotel failure may involve Strongpoint 
10 focussing terminal scour onto the area where the D zone base plane meets the beach. 
However, substantial upgrading of the revetment had taken place over two years before 
the first surface cracking was observed (Fig. 4.2b). Also this theory fails to explain the 
reactivation in 2001 when Strongpoint 12 would have protected against this possibility.    45 
It  has  been  suggested  that  removal  of  trees  from  the  clifftop  has  contributed  to  an 
unsustainable rise in groundwater levels within the Barton Clay (New Milton Advertiser 
17
th Feb. 1968; Delair 2003). Small-scale revegetation schemes have been put in place by 
New Forest District Council towards the golf course end of the frontage (Gray et al 1994; 
Avenues 1999). However, the clay exhibits both a high hydrostatic retention capacity and 
a very ‘heavy’ nature which makes it difficult for large plants to take root, and only in the 
colluvium, containing quantities of sand and gravel, is this likely to be a possible partial 
solution. Also groundwater flows from the springs in the Barton Clay within the study 
area are much greater than can be expected to be significantly depleted by root take-up. 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 (above) The western end of the sheet-piling at MH7 in disrupted state on 14
th June 1977 
(Halcrow 1978a). 
 
Fig. 4.2  (next four pages) Aerial photograph series of the Tom’s Garden / Cliff House Hotel area, 
showing the development of failures, movement of sheet-piling, manholes, revetment and 
shoreline. Photographs from 1967 to 1996 c/o NFDC archive – post-1996 c/o Channel Coast 
Observatory 
(a) 8
th March 1967; (b) 6
th April 1978; (c) 16
th May 1986; (d) 31
st May 1989; (e) 17
th June 1990;  
(f) 12
th May 1991; (g) 26
th July 1996; (h) Summer 1998; (i) 6
th May 2001; (j) 24
th April 2004 
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Fig. 4.3 Extent of landslides at Cliff House Hotel in 1981/2. The red lines mark the failures 
observed in March 1981 and the violet lines the failures observed in May 1982. The May failure 
below Sea Road is the only occurrence of instability in this vicinity and probably derives from the 
slope regrading at this point being too steep. Note the significant seaward movement of the 
western end of the sheet-piling and MH7, in the centre of a 1500m
2 failure zone. From Halcrow 
drawings BSD/105 and BSD/107, and a ground plan from High-Point Rendel (1998d). 
Fig. 4.4 (below) Halcrow plan BSD/110 of 1982 – plan of works to stabilise MH7 
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Fig. 4.5 Map showing movement of the revetment holding back the landslide toe at Cliff House 
Hotel before and after the December 1993 slide and after the February 2001 slide, prepared from 
aerial photographs provided by NFDC and a ground plan from High-Point Rendel (1998d). Note 
the comments in Fig. 4.2 regarding rectification of the photographs. The eastern strongpoint was 
under construction when the 1993 slide occurred, so is absent from the 1991 photograph. The 
extent  of  seaward  movement  of  the  landslide  toe  correlates  with  the  cross-shore  profiles  in 
Appendix 2.   53 
 
 
Fig. 4.6 (above) The Cliff House Hotel failure – looking down from above the former upper road 
where the sheet-pile was severed in Feb. 2001, towards the new strongpoint (No. 12) of 1993.  
Note the shoreline is much farther out on the right, due to the landslide toe movement. 
Fig. 4.7 (below) Looking up the gulley towards the eastern end of the broken sheet-pile wall. The 
stream running down here is fed by the ‘large spring’ referred to in Rendel Geotechnics (1994b). 
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Fig. 4.8 (above) The broken end of the in-situ sheet-pile with the remains of a drainage pipe, 
looking into the gulley at the eastern boundary of the Cliff House Hotel slide. 
Fig. 4.9 (below) The detached section of sheet-pile, dislodged over 20m downslope and virtually 
lain flat.  
 
   55 
   
Fig. 4.10 (above) The view westward across the degraded expanse of the Cliff House Hotel slide 
in August 2007. The row of boulders in the middle distance (arrowed) marks the wall along the 
lower end of the access road near the bottom of survey line LX (Fig. 4.14) – the centre section of 
the road has vanished. The orange circle indicates the area of colluvium ‘island’ at around +5m 
AODN, seaward of the new western drainage gulley. A feature of this area is a section of 
exposed former pipe drain (the white feature in the centre of the circle). 
Fig. 4.11 (below) Drainfill gravel forming the bed of the upper central gulley at Cliff House Hotel. 
   56 
 
Fig. 4.12 (above) Part of the broken sheet-pile near the western boundary of the Cliff House Hotel 
slide, with a dislodged manhole cover (believed to be former MH8). Fig. 4.13 (below) Retreat of 
the cliff top at Cliff House Hotel, from aerial photographs provided by NFDC and a ground plan 
from High-Point Rendel (1998d). Only the 2001 and 2005 aerial photographs were fully rectified 
and  earlier  ones  have  been  georeferenced  in  ArcMap,  but  minor  inaccuracies  deriving  from 
corner curvature may remain. Significant retreats are above Tom’s Garden between 1967 and 
1991, (associated with the mudsliding during that period), and at Cliff House Hotel prior to the 
2001 survey (the 13
th February 2001 collapse). A second collapse in late April 2001 and later 
spalling has led to further retreat here since the 2001 photograph. The December 1993 slide 
extensively disrupted the ground below the cliff but did not cause significant clifftop retreat. 
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Fig. 4.14 Cross-shore profiles surveyed before and after the 17
th December 1993 landslide at Cliff 
House Hotel, and the longshore transects used to calculate the F zone concretion layer and other 
marker  horizons  by  reference  to  known  strata  in  boreholes  and  cliff  exposures  in  Table  4.1. 
Derived  from  High-Point  Rendel  (1998d),  borehole  log  data  from  High-Point  Rendel,  Soil 
Mechanics Ltd and NFDC archives and survey data from CCO and the John Cross archive. 
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Longshore transect under Cliff House Hotel
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Fig. 4.15 Longshore profile of the upper access track surface (the top of the sheet-piling) and the 
F zone concretions (derived from Table 4.1) at Cliff House Hotel. Drain and sheet pile depths are 
from Halcrow drawing BS2/49 of 1970 (Fig. 3.2), and sand/clay boundary depths are extrapolated 
using Burton (1929) (Table 4.1). Note the bottom of the piling is above the level of the concretions 
in the slide area, but the drain is close to the sand/clay boundary. Compare with Fig. 5.12 for a 
similar plot at Hoskins Gap West. 
 
 
Fig. 4.16 (next page) Geomorphological map of the Barton cliffs prepared by High-Point Rendel 
(1998d), showing the then extent of landslide activity. Note the inactive area at the foot of Sea 
Road, between the two study areas of Cliff House Hotel and Hoskins Gap West. 
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Fig. 4.17 (above) Positions of the mole drains inserted at Cliff House Hotel, and the repaired 
drainage system in the undercliff. Note the western mole drain array feeds into the Tom’s Garden 
surface drain fan rather than the deep drains. From NFDC plan in Drury & Le Pen (1998). 
Fig. 4.18 (below) The present-day semi-natural drainage pattern at Cliff House Hotel, with most 
water draining via the new central gulley between the ‘island’ and the central bog, but substantial 
flows from the Cliff House Hotel spring still following the eastern gulley. The boundary between 
these catchments is formed by a ridge of slumped cliff-face. The Tom’s Garden area and the 
western part of the Cliff House Hotel slide drain into the beach area  west of Strongpoint 10. 
Prepared from the 2004 CCO Aerial photograph (Fig. 4.2j) and High-Point Rendel (1998d). 
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Table 4.1a-d (below) Interpolations and extrapolations of key marker horizons within the Barton-
on-Sea cliffs, determined from the position of F zone concretions within boreholes H2, BH2, BH4, 
I3,  I4  and  B21  and  exposures  in  the  undercliff  50m  west  of  Tom’s  Garden  (NODW1  and 
NODW2), in the eastern gulley under Cliff House Hotel (NODC1) and under Sea Road (NODE1 
and NODE2). Fields marked in yellow are measured elevations. Where transects intersect levels 
are set according to the nearest recorded marker level. The elevations of the sand/clay boundary 
(4.3m above the concretions) and the D zone  base plane (13.7m below the  concretions) are 
determined by calculation from reference to Burton (1929). See Fig. 4.14 for locations and profile 
lines.  
 
 
Table 4.1 (a) 
Exposure Transect 
  E  N 
Sand/Clay 
boundary 
Top of F 
zone 
concretions 
Bottom of F 
zone 
concretions 
Base of D 
zone 
         Elevations in m AODN 
NODW2 Exposure  423038.029  93065.385  22.767  18.467  18.217  4.517 
NODW1 Exposure  423039.991  93063.095  22.761  18.461  18.211  4.511 
C2 Profile Line  423091  93047  22.056  17.756  17.506  3.806 
LX Profile Line  423125  93037  21.586  17.286  17.036  3.336 
LX1 Profile Line  423166  93024  21.020  16.720  16.470  2.770 
LX2 Profile Line  423183  93018  20.785  16.485  16.235  2.535 
L1 Profile Line  423209  93009  20.426  16.126  15.876  2.176 
L1A Profile Line  423254  92996  19.804  15.504  15.254  1.554 
L2 Profile Line  423274  92990  19.528  15.228  14.978  1.278 
L2A Profile Line  423301  92980  19.155  14.855  14.605  0.905 
L3 Profile Line  423320  92974  18.892  14.592  14.342  0.642 
L3A Profile Line  423336  92969  18.671  14.371  14.121  0.421 
NODC1 Exposure  423341.131  92969.32  18.600  14.300  14.050  0.350 
L4 Exposure  423361  92961  18.385  14.085  13.827  0.127 
NODE2 Exposure  423401.291  92949.153  17.949  13.649  13.374  -0.326 
L5 Profile Line  423403  92948  17.931  13.631  13.355  -0.345 
NODE1 Exposure  423406.47  92947.731  17.817  13.517  13.242  -0.458 
 
Table 4.1 (b)  
Eastern Exposure 
Transect  E  N 
Sand/Clay 
boundary 
Top of F 
zone 
concretions 
Bottom of F 
zone 
concretions 
Base of D 
zone 
         Elevations in m AODN 
NODE1 Exposure  423406.47  92947.731  17.817  13.517  13.242  -0.458 
G14 Survey Point  423459  92943  17.060  12.760  12.497  -1.203 
D1 Survey Point  423490  92940  16.613  12.313  12.057  -1.643 
BT2P2 Profile Line  423580  92934  15.316  11.016  10.780  -2.920 
G15C Survey Point  423611  92931  14.869  10.569  10.341  -3.359 
GL3P3 Profile Line  423631  92929  14.580  10.280  10.057  -3.643 
MH16 Survey Point  423716  92923  13.355  9.055  8.851  -4.849 
BH2 Borehole  423733.7  92922.7  13.100  8.800  8.600  -5.100 
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Table 4.1 (c) 
Lower Transect 
  E  N 
Sand/Clay 
boundary 
Top of F 
zone 
concretions 
Bottom of F 
zone 
concretions 
Base of D 
zone 
         Elevations in m AODN 
C2 Profile Line  423085  93018  22.051  17.751  17.400  3.700 
LX Profile Line  423118  93013  21.610  17.310  16.977  3.277 
LX1 Profile Line  423161  93007  21.036  16.736  16.426  2.726 
LX2 Profile Line  423181  93004  20.769  16.469  16.170  2.470 
L1 Profile Line  423206  93000  20.435  16.135  15.849  2.149 
L1A Profile Line  423254  92993  19.795  15.495  15.234  1.534 
L2 Profile Line  423274  92990  19.528  15.228  14.978  1.278 
L2A Profile Line  423303  92986  19.140  14.840  14.606  0.906 
L3 Profile Line  423322  92983  18.887  14.587  14.362  0.662 
L3A Profile Line  423339  92980  18.660  14.360  14.144  0.444 
L4 Profile Line  423362  92977  18.353  14.053  13.849  0.149 
B21 Borehole  423368.2  92978  18.270  13.970  13.770  0.070 
L5 Profile Line  423407  92970  17.721  13.421  13.221  -0.479 
GL1P3 Profile Line  423456  92962  17.028  12.728  12.528  -1.172 
PT2 Survey Point  423520  92954  16.123  11.823  11.623  -2.077 
GL2P3 Profile Line  423539  92951  15.854  11.554  11.354  -2.346 
BT2P1 Profile Line  423582  92943  15.246  10.946  10.746  -2.954 
Extrapolation of BH1 
borehole  423668.7  92932.5  14.050  9.750  9.450  -4.250 
BH2 Borehole  423733.7  92922.7  13.100  8.800  8.600  -5.100 
I4 Borehole  423845.8  92906.2  11.620  7.320  6.970  -6.730 
 
Table 4.1 (d)  
Upper Transect 
  E  N 
Sand/Clay 
boundary 
Top of F 
zone 
concretions 
Bottom of F 
zone 
concretions 
Base of D 
zone 
         Elevations in m AODN 
C2 Profile Line  423091  93045  22.112  17.812  17.559  3.859 
LX Profile Line  423126  93039  21.586  17.286  17.036  3.336 
LX1 Profile Line  423169  93032  20.940  16.640  16.394  2.694 
LX2 Profile Line  423185  93029  20.700  16.400  16.155  2.455 
L1 Profile Line  423215  93025  20.249  15.949  15.707  2.007 
L1A Profile Line  423256  93017  19.633  15.333  15.094  1.394 
L2 Profile Line  423279  93014  19.287  14.987  14.750  1.050 
L2A Profile Line  423306  93009  18.882  14.582  14.347  0.647 
I1/I1A Borehole  423324.9  93006.1  18.598  14.298  14.064  0.364 
L3 Profile Line  423327  93006  18.566  14.266  14.033  0.333 
L3A Profile Line  423344  93003  18.310  14.010  13.779  0.079 
L4 Profile Line  423362  93000  18.040  13.740  13.510  -0.210 
L5 Profile Line  423411  92992  17.301  13.001  12.760  -0.940 
I2 Borehole  423493.5  92978.7  16.056  11.756  11.496  -2.204 
GL2P2 Profile Line  423541  92969  15.339  11.039  10.769  -2.931 
GL3P2 Profile Line  423633  92954  13.951  9.651  9.360  -4.340 
BH3 Borehole  423670.2  92947.8  13.390  9.090  8.790  -4.910 
BH4 Borehole  423735.5  92936.9  11.960  7.660  7.060  -6.640 
H2 Borehole  423751.3  92936.7  12.890  8.590  8.190  -5.510   63 
5. Failures in the Vicinity of Hoskins Gap 1989-2007 
 
5.1.  At the foot of Hoskins Gap - 1989 
 
During the late 1980s further movement around the foot of Hoskins Gap was causing 
concern, and Halcrow designed a new section of wall, this time of concrete between two 
rows of sheet-piling with land anchors driven several metres into the clay, to provide 
additional support to the cliff (Fig. 5.1). This replaced the remaining trial length of wall 
from  1964  (Figs.  3.1,  3.2).  Unfortunately,  the  construction  activity  seems  to  have 
contributed to further destabilising the cliff, and a bungalow within the clifftop danger 
zone had to be demolished (Dunn pers. comm. 2007). The monthly topographic surveys 
conducted  since  1995  show  minimal  surface  movement  at  Hoskins  Gap,  although 
Inclinometer I3, installed after completion of this wall, showed continued movement at 
the sand/clay boundary throughout twelve years of operation so, whilst there has not been 
a further major failure here since installation of the anchored concrete wall the undercliff 
to landward of the wall is evidently still not fully stabilised. 
 
Reactivation of movement around and to the west of Hoskins Gap in early 1995 was 
attributed to the F zone horizon in Rendel Geotechnics (1995c).  
 
In December 1995 an internal NFDC memo (NFDC 1995) reported the fracture of a pipe 
between two manholes either side of the sheet-pile wall directly below Hoskins Gap, 
which  required  urgent  repair  scheduled  for  February-March  1996.  In  the  period  30
th 
November 1995 to 29
th April 1996 Inclinometer I3, at Hoskins Gap, showed an increase 
in displacement to seaward of approximately 5mm, although this was somewhat reduced 
in following months. 
 
5.2.  New Failures at Hoskins Gap West 
 
100m west of Hoskins Gap a new zone of instability began to become apparent in the 
mid-1990s. This area will be referred to as Hoskins Gap West.    64 
It is reported in High-Point Rendel (1998c) that the drainage system around manhole 
MH18 (the former MH12, halfway between profile lines BT2 and GL3, Figs. 5.2, 5.3) 
was experiencing ground movement during the early part of 1997, with the downslope 
drainage pipe (under the sheet-pile wall) observed to be projecting into the manhole, and 
also into the catchpit (CP18) downslope, as the wall and the main cut-off drain were 
pushed seawards. The maximum rate of discharge recorded through MH18/CP18 during 
1997 was only 10 litres/minute, whilst at MH20 (the next manhole to the west, formerly 
MH11,  Fig.  5.3),  combined  flow  rates  into  the  chamber  up  to  94  litres/minute  were 
observed over the same period and for MH21 (ex-MH10) at the foot of Sea Road the 
maximum combined figure is 230 litres/minute (High-Point Rendel 1998c). Drury & Le 
Pen (1998) suggest the high flows in MH21 could be due to highway drainage channelled 
down  the  Sea  Road  access  road,  augmented  by  a  culverted  stream,  but  express 
reservations about the reliability of the manhole flow rates.  
 
The high rates of flow at Sea Road indicate that, if blockages occur in the outfalls for 
MH20/MH21 and the water move down-dip to the next available discharge point this 
could  produce  a  3300%  increase  in  discharge  through  MH18.  Confusingly  the 
classification of MH19 does not appear to have been used in the renumbering of the 
manhole sequence.  
 
A letter from NFDC in reply to an enquiry by several councillors (NFDC 1998) reported 
that in January 1998 the upper access track between Sea Road and Hoskins Gap had been 
slipping seawards at up to 10mm per day (an acceleration of around 10x the annual rate 
for 1997), producing tension cracks in the undercliff behind the sheet-pile wall (Fig. 5.4). 
Seaward  movement  of  the  colluvium  above  a  clearly-defined  slide  plane  produced  a 
pronounced cliff below the roadway (Fig. 5.5 – unfortunately it has not proved possible 
to find a surveyed elevation for this cliff, to verify its stratigraphic position). This had led 
to the need to close this path to the public. At this location the F zone nodules should be 
at c+10.5m AODN by interpolation between BH2 and the exposure under Sea Road (Fig. 
4.14, Table 4.1).  
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The first movement observed in the monthly survey points, which were recorded here 
from October 1995, occurs in December 1998 (following 142.5mm of rainfall in October 
1998),  with  a  lateral  displacement  of  piezometers  C2  and  C3 located  seaward  of  the 
sheet-pile wall (Fig. 5.2). Piezometers C1, C2 and C3 all moved further seaward around 
the time of high rainfall recorded in December 1999, as did survey point PT2, 40m west 
of C2 and seaward of the sheet-pile just east of point PT1 (Fig. 5.2). All these points, and 
additionally PT1 showed significant movement immediately following the high rainfall 
of November 2000, which continued at a slower rate throughout the winter of 2000/1. 
This coincides with the period during which the 2001 Cliff House Hotel failure took 
place.  
 
By February 2001 (Fig. 5.6) the berm and roadway seaward of the wall were heavily 
disrupted and the ground behind had sunk up to 0.5m below the surface of the piling. A 
new  section  of  pipe  drain  was  inserted  under  the  wall  at  its  point  of  maximum 
displacement,  to  drain  the  excess  pressure  building  up,  and  the  roadway  was  re-
constructed  landward  of  the  now-sinuous  sheet-pile  during  2001.  This  led  to  a  short 
period of stability, before movement over the stretch between PT1 and MH18 was again 
triggered at the time of heavy rainfall in November 2002 (Fig. 5.7). 
 
Some cross-shore profiles were surveyed in this area at the time of installation of the 
wall, and  again in the  early 1990s but none since the onset of movement. Sufficient 
survey  points  have,  however,  been  recorded along  or  near  to  line  BT2  to enable  the 
production of Fig. 5.8, which plots movement along the transect with respect to the D 
zone base plane, F zone concretions and the sand/clay boundary determined from Table 
4.1.  
 
By 2003 there was little support for the wall in the disrupted colluvium to seaward, but 
the sheet-piling remained close to vertical where exposed, suggesting a translation slide 
below the base of the piles (this correlates with the ‘cliffing’ in Fig. 5.5). This continued 
to be the case until the wall finally breached in December 2006 (Fig. 5.9), whereupon the 
landslide  rapidly  changed  in  character  from  a  relatively  deep-seated  movement   66 
translating  the  vertical  sheet-piling  to  a  near-surface  mudslide  which  has,  in  the  few 
months  since,  bent  the  now-separated  piling  to  almost  45°  from  vertical  (Figs.  5.10, 
5.11). On a site visit in July 2007 the distorted sheet pile appears to be still rooted at 
approximately its original elevation, but bowed out to seawards by 10-15m. Around the 
point of maximum displacement 4m height of piling is exposed, and through the breach 
flows a stream running over the gravel remaining from the former drain backfill and out 
into a very wet and highly degraded area of colluvium (Fig. 5.10).  
 
5.3.  Clues to the Failure Mechanism 
 
Halcrow drawing 67-2931 gives the depth of piling between the then MH12 and MH13 
as 24ft 6in (7.5m), with the depth to the base of the drain trench as 11ft 3in (3.46m), and 
estimates the depth to the sand/clay boundary as 18ft 1½in (5.57m) based on boreholes 
sunk at the time of construction. This information has been used together with the data in 
Table 4.1 to construct a longshore section along the sheet-pile wall (Fig. 5.12). 
 
The Halcrow interpretation of the sand/clay boundary is slightly more conservative than 
the later estimate (Fig. 5.12). In the diagram it is assumed that the Barton Clay strata are 
intact below this boundary, but this may not be the case. The clay within the colluvium is 
very  similar  in  appearance  and  virtually  identical  in  composition  to  the  undisturbed 
fissured material below, and although permeability and shear strength testing was carried 
out  on  borehole  samples,  none  of  the  logs  (Appendix  3)  clearly  indicate  where  the 
colluvium ends and the undeformed clay begins.  
 
We know from inclinometer records that the principal shallow plane of movement is 
observed  at  +16m  AODN  at  Inclinometer  I2 (Fig.  1.2).  The  elevation  of  the  F  zone 
concretionary layer in I2, calculated from Table 4.1, is +11.75m AODN, giving around 
4.25m between the concretions and the slide plane. This is c2m greater than observed at 
I1 to the west, and places the preferred slide plane at I2 within the H zone at the sand/clay 
boundary.  
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The equivalent elevations for I3 at Hoskins Gap are +11m for the preferred slide plane 
and +8.4m AODN for the concretionary layer (by interpolation between BH2 and BH4, 
and extrapolation for the dip of strata), placing the slide plane here at about the same 
stratigraphic level as in I1. This will be discussed further in Section 6.5. 
 
In  the  vicinity  of the  Hoskins  Gap  West  failure the  sheet-piling  was  c35m  from  the 
present Plateau Gravels backscar before displacement commenced (the original design 
called for an optimum 70ft (21.5m) – Halcrow (1965)). The position both downslope and 
downdip of the high groundwater flows observed at Sea Road in MH20 and MH21 and 
the large surface area of colluvium exposed in the upper undercliff at this locality may 
function as a reservoir, enabling water to accumulate landward of the wall. The area was 
observed  to  be  heavily  vegetated  with  wetland  plants  and  to  contain  visible  surface 
ponding on a site visit in July 2007. The fact that the cut-off drain does not reach to the 
depth of the sand/clay boundary (Fig. 5.12) indicates that it cannot effectively drain such 
a reservoir. 
 
 From both Figs. 5.8 and 5.12 it can be seen that the sheet-piling is driven below the 
expected depth of the sand/clay boundary, but in the vicinity of the landslide the piles do 
not reach down to the F zone concretions, being about 1m above them. Further to the 
west the top of the piling (and therefore also its foot) are more level in the vicinity of Sea 
Road, whilst the concretions continue to rise with the natural stratigraphic dip. As stated 
in Section 2.3 it is likely that the concretion layer is even less permeable than the fissured 
clay, so it might be expected that water accumulating in the clay would be more likely to 
travel  downdip  through  fissures  and  shelly/sandy  lenses  than  directly  down  into  the 
concretions, and where the sheet-piling is founded in or below the concretions this will 
form an effective barrier channelling groundwater flow downdip. Where the piling does 
not reach the concretion layer, east of MH20, there is the opportunity for accumulating 
groundwater  to  both  lubricate  layers  of  weakness  and  raise  pore  pressures,  hence 
providing a motive force for translating the ground above (including the sheet-piled wall) 
downslope and seaward. 
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5.4.  Possible Mechanisms for the Failure 
 
As with the Cliff House Hotel slide (Section 4.9), although a wealth of information has 
been utilised in compiling this report, it became apparent that new interpretations needed 
to be drawn from each newly-discovered group of data. In particular the discoveries that 
the sheet-piling did not reach the F zone concretions in the areas of activity, and that the 
cut-off drain was, for the most part, not as deep as the sand/clay layer, led to a major 
revision in thinking by the author. It therefore follows that further new information may 
lead  to  a  need  to  reinterpret  the  data  included  here.  The  provision  of  boreholes  and 
inclinometers both landward and seaward of the dislocated sheet-piling east of the breach 
may have provided very useful fresh data prior to the occurrence of the breach, including 
a confirmation of the slide plane elevation, but now the landslide has entered a different 
phase of activity this may be of questionable value. 
 
Based on the data available at the time of writing, a preliminary hypothesis for the failure 
between Sea Road and Hoskins Gap, therefore, might be: 
•  The  large  surface  area  of  undercliff  behind  the  sheet-pile  wall  allowed  the 
accumulation of excessive quantities of groundwater within the colluvium and the 
clay beneath. 
•  The drainage system behind the sheet-pile wall was inadequate and incapable of 
draining this reservoir, and became overloaded leading to build-up of pore pressure 
within the undercliff landward of the wall.  
•  The wall at this point was founded below the preferred slide plane observed in the 
record of inclinometer  I2, so instead of triggering a shallow-based slide (which 
would likely have occurred if the wall had been absent) the water accumulated, 
increasing  pore  pressures  at  greater  depths,  leading  to  activation  of  a  plane  of 
weakness, such as an extended shelly lens, at or near the F zone nodule layer. 
•  This permitted sufficient displacement of the clay and colluvium behind the entire 
height  of  the  wall  to  enable  horizontal  translation  of  the wall  to seaward.  This 
restricted flow in the MH18 outfall by pushing the manhole forward onto the pipe, 
further reducing drainage and thereby creating a positive feedback mechanism.   69 
•  The  emergency  drain  inserted  at  the  point  of  maximum  displacement  was  still 
insufficient to drain the area, which was fed by springs in the cliff and under Sea 
Road, and the wall eventually breached.  
•  After the breach pressure was released by shallow seaward mudsliding, dislocating 
and flattening the sheet-pile in the vicinity of the breach. 
 
It is suggested that this occurred in this locality due to the juxtaposition of the sheet-pile 
foundation and the F zone nodules, and to the much greater width of undercliff behind the 
wall than was originally designed for. It is possible that the slide plane observed above 
the F zone nodules at Hoskins Gap West may have been merely a seepage horizon in the 
natural state of the cliffs (as in the exposure west of Tom’s Garden), and it was the 
excessive pressure built up by the accumulation of undrained water behind the wall that 
led to the first slipping on this plane. Therefore the sheet-pile can be seen to contribute 
both to the instability at Hoskins Gap West and to the relative stability of the ground 
between this failure and Sea Road.  
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Fig. 5.1 Halcrow drawing WV/BSD/101 of May 1989 detailing the anchored sheet-pile wall 
installed at Hoskins Gap in 1989.  
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Fig. 5.2 (above) Survey points at the Hoskins Gap West failure zone.    
Fig. 5.3 (below) Location map for manholes at Hoskins Gap West, using the post-1990 
renumbering scheme. From High-Point Rendel (1998d), NFDC monthly survey data and CCO 
2004 aerial photograph. 
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Fig. 5.4 (above) Early stages in the bowing of the sheet-piling at Hoskins Gap West, with a 
depression forming behind the translated piling. Taken from High-Point Rendel (1998c). 26/01/98. 
Fig.  5.5  (below)  View  of  the  developing  slide  plane  at  the  Hoskins  Gap  West  failure.  The 
colluvium  above the arrowed line is slipping seaward creating a steeper cliffed section  which 
High-Point Rendel (1998c) reported as along the line of the F1/F2 boundary just above the F 
zone concretionary layer. 26
th January 1998 (High-Point Rendel 1998c) 
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Fig. 5.6 (above) The same view as in Fig. 5.4 on 13
th February 2001, with the path highly 
disrupted and the sheet-pile more sharply bowed. NFDC archive. 
Fig. 5.7 (below) Two years after Fig. 5.6 and the roadway has been remade behind the displaced 
piling, but cracks continue to develop. (NFDC archive 23
rd December 2002). 
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Line BT2, 100m W of Hoskins Gap
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Fig. 5.8 Profile of the undercliff at the Hoskins Gap West failure. March 1995 data courtesy of the John Cross archive. All other data from NFDC 
records,  using  13  survey  points  on  or  within  2m  of  the  BT2/GL2A  profile  line.  The  F  zone  concretion  layer  has  been  determined  by  three 
exposures along a transect indicated by the blue dotted line, and by extrapolation and interpolation from the logs of boreholes along two further 
transects, the upper one passing through H2, BH4 and BH3 and the lower through I4, BH2 and B21. The Sand/Clay boundary and the slide plane 
at the base of the D zone have been determined from borehole logs and by extrapolation from Burton (1929) (Table 4.1). The points for July 2004 
to November 2006 all refer to survey point BT2P1, which has slumped from its position in March 1997 (arrowed).   75 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.9 (above) The wall finally breached 
in December 2006, adjacent to the figure 
in the middle distance, but was still close 
to  vertical  at  that  time  (NFDC  archive, 
18
th December 2006). 
 
Fig. 5.10 (left) A close-up of the breach 
at Hoskins Gap West, showing the 
drainfill gravel now forming the bed of an 
outflow stream, and the piling severely 
distorted from the vertical. Even on a dry 
summer day the flow is considerable. 
Once the wall had breached this then 
formed a conduit for the saturated 
undercliff material to surge forward. July 
2007 
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Fig. 5.11 (above) The remaining material seaward of the wall is saturated, loose and highly 
degraded and provides no support to the wall. The piling has been displaced significantly from the 
vertical in just eight months following breaching (compare Fig. 5.8). July 2007 
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Fig. 5.12 (above) Longshore profile of the upper access track surface (the top of the sheet-piling) 
and the F zone concretions (derived from Table 4.1) at the Hoskins Gap West failure. Drain and 
sheet pile depths are from Halcrow drawing 67-2931, and sand/clay boundary depths are shown 
from both Halcrow’s 1964 boreholes (drawing 67-2931) and from extrapolation using Burton 
(1929) (Table 4.1). Note the piling changes slope a few metres west of the landslide boundary.         77 
6. Ground Investigations - Borehole Logs and Inclinometers 
 
The  logs  of  seventeen  boreholes  within  the  Barton  cliffs  have  been  located  and  are 
detailed in  Sections 6.1 to 6.4,  and summarised in Table 6.1.  Section 6.5 details the 
results of the four inclinometers in operation between 1990 and 2003. 
 
6.1.  Soil Mechanics Ltd Boreholes – 1988 
 
Six  boreholes  were  made  in  the  vicinity  of  Hoskins  Gap  by  Soil  Mechanics  Ltd.  in 
February - March 1988 (Fig. 6.1). Borehole H1 was set about 30m landward of the cliff 
top and the other five (H2-H6) near the junction of the path down Hoskins Gap with the 
upper access road, behind the anchored sheet pile wall reconstructed in 1988-9.  
 
The logs of these boreholes (Appendix 3) reveal a calcareous mudstone layer (believed to 
be the F zone concretions) at +7.6 to +7.3m AODN (H1); +11.3 to +11.0m AODN and 
+8.6 to +8.2m AODN (H2) and +9.1 to +8.7m AODN (H4). H3, H5 and H6 were not 
driven  deep  enough  to  encounter  any  concretions.  Groundwater  levels  encountered 
during boring were 10.30m from surface (H1), 1m from surface (H2) and 1.2m from 
surface (H4). They were not recorded for the three shallower boreholes (Soil Mechanics 
1988).  
 
Two concretionary layers were observed in H2 (immediately west of H3). Neither of 
these correlates with other nearby boreholes – H3 was driven to +10.46m AODN but did 
not pick up the upper band, RWP’s BH4 (see below) recorded one layer at +7.06m to 
+7.56m AODN – both these two boreholes are within 10m of H2. Burton (1929) does 
however indicate occasional concretions within the lower levels of the H zone, and the 
layer at c+11m AODN may represent one of these. Polished surfaces were observed in 
H4 above and below the concretionary layer. Although the one immediately above this 
layer accords well with the believed position of the F1/F2 boundary it is at a steep angle 
of slide, suggesting the polishing is not associated with a slide plane in the orientation of 
the bedding (the dip of strata being only 0.75°). In H2 there is an observed shell-rich   78 
band 1.6m above the lower concretionary layer, which could be a fragment of the G zone. 
Although this distance between the G zone and F zone concretions is less than observed 
at exposures to the west (see Section 2.1) it accords well with Burton’s (1929) original 
observation, believed to have been made in the vicinity of Hoskins Gap. The presence of 
a shear zone and three polished surfaces in H2 shows considerable disruption (this area 
had been heavily engineered during construction of the trial cut-off drain in 1964, then 
subject to the Barton Court failure of 1974 and the Hoskins Gap instability in 1989). 
 
The deepest borehole, H4 was driven to -11.66m AODN, yet below +6.5m AODN the 
material driven through is described simply as ‘very stiff clay’ with no further calcareous 
layers. However, the nodules in the C zone, which should be around -6.5m AODN, are 
discontinuous,  unlike  the  exposed  sections  of  the  F  zone  concretionary  layer,  so  the 
borehole  may  have  passed  through  this  layer  between  adjacent  nodules.  At  the  very 
bottom  (c-11m  AODN)  “glauconite  sand  and  silt  partings”  are  reported,  which  is 
indicative of reaching the A horizons. This agrees with the log in Burton (1929). 
 
The boreholes were used for an array of instruments, H1 housing a standpipe piezometer, 
H2  a  slip  indicator,  H3,  H5  and  H6  pneumatic  piezometers  and  H4  the  first  trial 
inclinometer (Soil Mechanics 1988), which is recorded in the NFDC archive as being 
commissioned on 02/03/88.  
 
6.2.  Structural Soils Ltd Boreholes – 1989 
 
Robert  West  &  Partners  (RWP)  consulted  on  providing  vibrating  wire  piezometers, 
which were installed in July 1990 in holes bored by Structural Soils Ltd in June 1989 
(RWP 1992). Six further holes (BH1-6) were bored for this purpose, all near Hoskins 
Gap on two cross-shore transects (Fig. 6.1). BH1 was in the middle roadway seaward of 
the sheet-pile wall, BH3 landward of the sheet-pile in the undercliff and BH5 in the car 
park 20m landward of the cliff face on the western transect, and BH2 and BH4 either side 
of the middle roadway and BH6 near to Soil Mechanics’ H1 on the cliff. Due to the   79 
sheet-pile wall being placed further out around Barton Court BH2 is just landward of the 
sheet-pile and BH4 10m nearer to the cliff face.  
 
Logs for all four piezometer boreholes in the undercliff (Structural Soils Ltd 1989) reveal 
presence of a ‘Grey weathered calcareous mudstone (weak)’ at about +9.25m to +9.55m 
AODN (BH1); +8.61m to +8.81m AODN (BH2); +8.79m to +9.09m AODN (BH3) and 
+7.06m to +7.56m AODN (BH4). This layer sits between thicker bands described as 
‘Stiff dark-grey laminated clay with laminae of blue-green silt and fossil debris’, and is 
likely to represent the concretion layer at the top of the F1 zone.  
 
Groundwater  levels  recorded  during  the  drilling  of  the  boreholes  reveal  that  BH1, 
seaward of the sheet-pile wall, was driven to 15.05m below surface (at +18.75m AODN) 
without  encountering  groundwater;  BH2  and  BH3  just  landward  of  the  sheet-piling 
recorded groundwater at between 8m and 9m from surface, but BH4, only 10m from the 
sheet-pile wall and a similar distance from the cliff face, shows groundwater at 3.6m 
below the surface level of 20.16m. (The significantly lower groundwater levels when 
compared with the Soil Mechanics 1988 boreholes are due to the SM holes having been 
drilled  in  winter.)  This  illustrates  the  success  and  failings  of  the  sheet-pile  wall  and 
drainage system – it is seen to successfully dewater the colluvium to seaward of the wall 
as intended, and drains the area immediately behind the wall fairly well, but is less good 
at removing water from only a few metres back in the clay. This supports the assertion 
made in Section 5.3 that having to position the wall so far to seaward due to the boundary 
problems  encountered  (see  Section  3.3)  provided  a  much  larger  area  of  undercliff  in 
which to allow water to accumulate, and  made  a serious contribution to the ultimate 
failure of the drainage system.  
 
6.3.  Inclinometer Boreholes – 1990 
 
In June 1990 Soil Mechanics wrote to NFDC confirming that Halcrow’s had requested 
additional sampling and new boreholes had been driven and four inclinometers installed, 
these being inclinometers I1 to I4. I1 was placed under Cliff House Hotel, I2 between Sea   80 
Road and Hoskins Gap, I3 at Hoskins Gap and I4 under Barton Court between Hoskins 
Gap and Fisherman’s Walk (Fig. 1.2).  
 
I1 was located on the upper access road at 423319.75 E, 93007.10 N, elevation to surface 
+24.869m AODN. Utilising the data in Table 4.1 the nodular layer can be expected to be 
at about +14.3m AODN. Below the made ground and Barton Sand the fissured Barton 
Clay was reached at +17.6m AODN, and a medium to coarse shell sand band is located at 
+11.36m AODN (c6m below the expected position of the G zone – Table 4.1/Burton 
1929). At +4.7m AODN a ‘very hard, grey siltstone rock’ is encountered, at which the 
borehole was stopped (Soil Mechanics 1991). This may be the concretionary layer at the 
base of the F zone recorded also in the log of B21 (Section 6.4). Nowhere in the log is 
there any reference to concretions at the expected level of the F1/F2 boundary, and the 
log suggests that the Barton succession is in-situ at least 4.5m up into the Barton Sand.  
 
The next borehole to the east is I2, at 423493 E, 92978 N. This is in the relatively stable 
area of undercliff between the Cliff House Hotel and Hoskins Gap areas of activity, and 
is drilled into the upper terrace above the upper access road. The log records displaced 
Plateau Gravels down to +20.4m AODN and the clay below down to +16m AODN is 
described  variously  as  ‘soft’,  ‘damp’,  ‘sandy’  and  ‘silty’,  all  suggestive  of  disrupted 
colluvial material.  From +16m AODN down to the bottom of the borehole at +6.4m 
AODN the clay is described as ‘very stiff, dark and fissured’ (Soil Mechanics 1991). I2 is 
located  130m  east  of  B21  (Section  6.4)  and  170m  west  of  BH4,  and  interpolating 
between these other two logs (Table 4.1, Fig. 4.14) should place the top of the concretion 
layer at I2 at +11.75m AODN. This is well within the intact clay, yet this layer is, as with 
I1, absent from the log and no other features are recorded.  
 
Borehole I3 was driven through what appears from the log to be a largely intact sequence 
from the Barton Sand (bottoming out at +14.66m AODN) down through the Barton Clay 
to a maximum depth of -8.13m AODN. A medium to coarse shell sand band is described 
at +13.57m AODN and a calcareous mudstone layer at around +12.22m AODN (Soil 
Mechanics 1991). Although a calcareous layer is present, it is around 3m higher than in   81 
the log of H4 only 5m away, and probably accords with the higher concretions noted by 
Burton  in  H  (at  +11.3m  AODN)  rather  than  the  F  zone  nodular  stratum,  but  the 
possibility exists that there may be an error in measurement on this log. 
 
In borehole I4 the boundary between ‘Barton Sand’ (probably landslip debris) and Barton 
Clay is identified at +9.5m AODN, and a ‘moderately strong’ calcareous mudstone layer 
observed from +7.0m to +7.35m AODN (Soil Mechanics 1991), which is at the expected 
elevation  of  the  F  zone  concretions.  Below  this  layer  I4  is  driven  through  clay  with 
occasional pockets of highly striated, polished and often curved fissures down to -4.9m 
AODN with no other significant marker features. 
 
6.4.  Borehole B21 
 
A further borehole (B21) drilled in the upper access road near the junction with Sea Road 
access path, immediately to the east of the Cliff House Hotel landslide area at 423368 E 
92978 N, is referred to in Rendel Geotechnics (1993b). It is immediately adjacent to the 
former survey point B2 south-east of inclinometer I1/I1A in Fig. 4.14.  
 
The log for this borehole (Rendel Geotechnics 1993a) shows a ‘moderately weak light 
brownish-grey highly calcareous siltstone’ between +13.77m and +13.97m AODN and 
also describes an ‘irregular discontinuous slightly-polished surface’ at about +16.27m 
AODN  and  ‘occasional  fossil  shell lenses  and  partings’  throughout  the  4.2m  of  clay 
above the siltstone layer. B21 also shows a ‘highly calcareous siltstone’ at +5.4m AODN, 
just above a ‘hard band’ from +5.17m to +5.07m AODN and just below a ‘very stiff’ area 
of  ‘very  closely-spaced,  sub-horizontal  planar,  locally  polished,  locally  slickensided 
surfaces’ which is interpreted as the E/F zone boundary, according with Burton’s (1929) 
description of a further concretionary layer at the base of the F zone (Rendel Geotechnics 
1993a, Appendix 3). Above the polished surface at +16.27m AODN the material is still 
described as ‘slightly sandy silty clay’ and the presence of sandy lenses and partings 
suggests this could be the H zone. Above +18.17m AODN is a thin layer of clayey silt 
with small fossil shell partings, and then slip debris and made ground.    82 
B21, at 34.5m, is deeper than the other boreholes, reaching a depth of -12.33m AODN, 
and a further hard band at -3.93m to -4.03m AODN is likely to be the C zone nodular 
layer. A number of polished, slickensided surfaces are recorded between +2m and -4m 
AODN in this log, which may indicate movement within the D plane shear zone even to 
the east of the main Cliff House Hotel activity, although these surfaces may be relict. 
Below  -9.5m  AODN  yet  more  slickensided  surfaces  are  recorded  in  what  Rendel 
Geotechnics  (1993a)  interpret  as  the  Burton  A2  and  A3  zones.  Rendel  Geotechnics 
(1993b) suggest these sandier strata may provide underdrainage to the Barton Clay.  
 
6.5.  Inclinometer results – 1990 to 2003 
 
The first readings of the four new Soil Mechanics inclinometers were taken on 30
th May 
1990. The ‘A’ direction was roughly N-S and the ‘B’ direction roughly E-W – only two 
inclinometer pipes were accessible on an August 2007 visit, and these revealed that the 
‘A’ direction was 030.5° for I3 and 019.5° for I4.  
 
Fig. 6.2 shows two sets of graphs. The first is a displacement profile for each of the 
inclinometer boreholes, with start, end and several intermediate records. These are each 
followed by a time-series plot showing how the displacement at the principal slide plane 
has progressed during the operational life of the instrument, compared to monthly rainfall 
records. Complete datasets for I1A, I2 and I3 exist and have been processed using In-Site 
software, which enabled the incorporation of log data into the diagrams. This software 
was only available on a short-term trial basis and unfortunately the positions of the F 
zone  concretions  had  been  extrapolated  from  borehole  data  alone  and  were  not  as 
accurate  as  the  later  determination  using  cliff  exposures  as  well  as  logs  (Table  4.1). 
Therefore the concretionary layers in the logs shown in Fig. 6.2 are not correct. Please 
see the highlighted box in Fig 6.2 for revised details. 
 
Partial datasets exist for I1 and I4 and these have been reproduced in Excel, within Fig. 
6.2. 
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I1/I1A 
 
Inclinometer I1 was in operation from May 1990 until June 1996, when it failed and was 
replaced by a new inclinometer I1A at the same location. I1A survived from August 1996 
to August 2000. 
 
The most significant plane of movement recorded by Inclinometers I1 and I1A (Fig. 6.2) 
is at around +18m AODN (Soil Mechanics, NFDC archive). This is seen to be at the 
bottom of the Barton Sand in the I1 log, overlying the Barton Clay at +17.7m AODN 
(Soil Mechanics 1991), and is close to the level of the ‘discontinuous surface’ in nearby 
B21. The absence of a concretionary layer makes it difficult to confirm, but it appears 
from the interpolation in Table 4.1 that the shallower instability at Cliff House Hotel is 
focussed around 3.4m above the concretions, near the bottom of the Chama beds.  
 
The time series plot for I1 (Fig. 6.2) shows continuous movement throughout the 1994-5 
winter, followed by a relatively stable phase and then re-activation of movement around 
November  1995,  during  a  period  of  high  rainfall  (144.3mm).  The  displacement  then 
continued to increase at a fairly steady rate of 70mm/year to seaward until failure.  
 
Movement continued at a reduced rate of c30mm/year in I1A until achieving a metastable 
state in March 1997. A major ‘step’ in movement occurred following the November 1997 
high  rainfall  (154.5mm)  and,  after  another  metastable  period  in  Summer  1998 
displacement then resumed at a steady rate of around 12mm/year to seaward until failure. 
 
The incremental plots for I1A in Appendix 3 also show some movement below the main 
slide plane, with ‘peaks’ at +10m and +7m AODN. Extrapolating the concretionary layer 
from B21 (Appendix 3, Table 4.1) and comparing with Burton (1929) suggests that these 
minor peaks correspond to the layer of concretions reported near the bottom of the F 
zone, and the base of the shell-rich E zone respectively. 
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I2 
 
The principal displacement observed in I2 was at +16m AODN (Soil Mechanics, NFDC 
archive, Appendices 2 and 3), at the pre-existing boundary between the slipped material 
and the in-situ clay. From the data in Table 4.1 this would place the slide plane 4.25m 
above the concretions, within the Chama beds but at a higher level than observed in I1.  
 
Three main phases of movement can be identified during the nine years of operation, 
these being October 1993 to January 1994 (around the time of the first major Cliff House 
Hotel  failure  to  the  west),  between  November  1994  and  February  1995  and  from 
November 1997 to March 1998. The most significant movement in the 1993/4 phase of 
activity was following the Dec. 1993 survey. This was undertaken three days after the 
1993  Cliff  House  Hotel  landslide,  suggesting  the  movement  there  triggered  delayed 
sliding further down the bench in the following weeks. 
 
I3 
 
The principal displacement plane is at c+11.5m AODN (below the calcareous layer in the 
I3 log, supporting the assertion that this layer represents nodules in the sandy H zone). 
Placing the F zone concretionary layer using an average of nearby boreholes H2, H4, 
BH2 and BH4 gives a height of c+8.4m AODN, which implies that the preferred slide 
plane is around the base of the H zone. This is a comparable elevation to I1, but less than 
seen in I2. 
 
High-Point Rendel (1998c) report a constriction in the pipe for piezometer J12 at around 
7.9m depth from surface rendered this instrument inoperable from December 1997. J12 
was never included in the monthly NFDC topographic survey, but it is described as being 
‘on the slope landward of the upper access road close to Inclinometer I3’, and if the J12 
surface level is the same as for I3, this would place the constriction at the displacement 
horizon within I3 (the Sand/Clay boundary). 
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There is a considerable back-and-forth element to movement within I3 (time series plot, 
Fig. 6.2), although a significant displacement to seaward is apparent over the winters of 
1993-4 and particularly 1994-5 (reactivation of movement here at that time was reported 
in Rendel Geotechnics 1995c). These periods also saw significant eastward down-bench 
translation. Another ‘step’ to seaward is observed in November 1998 to February 1999.  
 
The December 1994 to March 1995 movement appears to lag about one month behind the 
equivalent significant movement in I2, further suggesting the trend of instability moving 
slowly downdip. 
 
I4 
 
The principal phase of movement of I4 occurred during the period for which the data has 
been lost. The displacement recorded on 26
th May 1992 was 13mm to seaward and 10mm 
to  the  east,  with  profile  peaks  at  +10.2m  and  +5.3m  AODN,  whilst  the  next  graph 
available, 23
rd September 1994, gives a seaward displacement of 85mm and a lateral 
displacement  eastwards  of  170mm,  with  a  maximum  seaward  displacement  at 
+12.3mAODN and the most extensive movement focussed on a plane at +9.3m AODN.  
 
The activity in I4 was  clearly shallow-seated, being almost entirely above the +9.3m 
AODN plane, although the earlier graphs (not reproduced) show displacement of 2-3mm 
down to around -3m AODN. The +9.3m AODN plane surface agrees perfectly with the 
‘Barton  Sand/Clay  interface’  noted  in  the  log  for  I4,  about  2m  to  2.5m  above  the 
calcareous layer (Soil Mechanics 1991). The ground in the vicinity of I4 was greatly 
disturbed  during  the  failures  of  1974  and  1989  and  the  construction  of  the  anchored 
sheet-piling in 1989, prior to the inclinometer being installed. 
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Fig. 6.1 Boreholes for piezometer and inclinometer locations east of Sea Road. The gulleyed path 
between BH5 and BH6 is Hoskins Gap. H1 to H6 are the original Soil Mechanics 1988 boreholes 
and housed a range of instruments (see text). BH1 to BH6 were provided by Robert West & 
Partners and housed vibrating wire piezometers. Derived from Rendel’s 1998 geomorphological 
map, a plan in RWP 1992 and NFDC survey data from 1998.   87 
Fig.  6.2  (next  six  pages)  Vertical  plots  of  inclinometer  displacement  and  time  series  of 
displacement at the maximum plane of displacement, compared to monthly rainfall, for the four 
inclinometers at Barton-on-Sea. From NFDC and Soil Mechanics Ltd data.  
 
NOTE:  The  plots  incorporating  logs  were  produced  using  a  one-week  trial  edition  of  In-Site 
software by courtesy of Soil Instruments Ltd. At the time the concretion layer was calculated from 
borehole data alone. After the exposures were surveyed (Table 4.1) the concretion elevations 
(absent in the log for boreholes I1, I2 and I3) were modified, but it has not been possible to renew 
the software. The correct elevations (from Table 4.1) are: 
 
Inclinometer I1 / I1A – Top of concretions at +14.3m AODN (the logs below are 0.7m too high) 
Inclinometer 2 – Top of concretions at +11.75m AODN (the logs below are 0.75m too low) 
Inclinometer 3 – Top of concretions at +8.4m AODN 
 
 
Inclinometer 1 displacement
1994-6 A direction
0
5
10
15
20
25
-
1
0
0
-
5
0
0
Displacement (mm)
E
l
e
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
A
O
D
N
 
(
m
)
26-02-91 1
23-09-94 1
21-10-94 1
21-12-94 1
30-01-95 1
28-02-95 1
30-03-95 1
26-04-95 1
31-05-95 1
04-07-95 1
27-07-95 1
31-08-95 1
26-09-95 1
31-10-95 1
30-11-95 1
04-01-96 1
31-01-96 1
05-03-96 1
01-04-96 1
29-04-96 1
29-05-96 1
Inclinometer 1 displacement
1994-6 B direction
0
5
10
15
20
25
-
5
0
0
Displacement (mm)
E
l
e
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
A
O
D
N
 
(
m
)
26-02-91 1
23-09-94 1
21-10-94 1
21-12-94 1
30-01-95 1
28-02-95 1
30-03-95 1
26-04-95 1
31-05-95 1
04-07-95 1
27-07-95 1
31-08-95 1
26-09-95 1
31-10-95 1
30-11-95 1
04-01-96 1
31-01-96 1
05-03-96 1
01-04-96 1
29-04-96 1
29-05-96 1
   88 
Displacement at Inclinometer I1
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Displacement at Inclinometer I1A
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Displacement at Inclinometer I2 - 1991 to 1995
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Displacement at Inclinometer I2 - 1996 to 2000
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Displacement at Inclinometer I3 - 1991 to 1995
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Displacement at Inclinometer I3 - 1996 to 2003
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Inclinometer 4 displacement
1994-6 A direction
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04-07-95 4
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31-08-95 4
26-09-95 4
31-10-95 4
30-11-95 4
04-01-96 4
31-01-96 4
05-03-96 4
01-04-96 4
29-04-96 4
29-05-96 4
25-06-96 4
30-07-96 4
28-08-96 4
02-10-96 4
29-10-96 4
26-11-96 4
Inclinometer 4 displacement
1994-6 B direction
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-
5
0
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
2
5
0
Displacement (mm)
E
l
e
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
A
O
D
N
 
(
m
)
26-02-91 4
21-12-94 4
30-01-95 4
28-02-95 4
30-03-95 4
26-04-95 4
31-05-95 4
04-07-95 4
27-07-95 4
31-08-95 4
26-09-95 4
31-10-95 4
30-11-95 4
04-01-96 4
31-01-96 4
05-03-96 4
01-04-96 4
29-04-96 4
29-05-96 4
25-06-96 4
   93 
Displacement at Inclinometer I4
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Borehole 
No. 
  I1  B21  I2  BH1  BH3  BH5  H5  BH4  BH6  BH2  H1  H2  H4  H3  I3  H6  I4 
Easting    423319  423368  423493  423668  423670  423674  423729  423735  423740  423733  423753  423748  423748  423753  423756  423767  423845 
Northing    93007  92978  92978  92937  92947  92983  92927  92937  92983  92922  92985  92935  92923  92935  92928  92923  92906 
Distance 
from I1 (m) 
  0  56  176  356  356  356  418  422  422  423  435  435  437  440  444  456  536 
Top of 
borehole 
24.869  22.17  24.513  18.75  18.49  33.67  18.6  20.16  33.34  17.01  33.61  20.44  18.14  20.36  18.367  17.74  13.371 
Boundary 
of disrupted 
and in-situ 
material 
22.37  18.27  16.01  15.15  12.39  32.47  12.9  12.36  31.74  12.21  30.61  12.24  13.34  12.66    12.54   
Top of 
Concretions 
in H zone 
                      11.34      12.22     
Barton 
Sand/Clay 
boundary 
17.67          14.87      14.84    11.41        14.66    9.5 
Apparent 
shear zone 
  17.97                    9.14  12.74?         
Shell Band 
(G zone) 
11.37  15.87, 
15.27 
and 
14.67 
      9.17                  13.57     
Top of F 
zone 
nodule 
layer 
  13.97    9.55  9.09  7.57    7.66    8.8  7.61  8.59  9.14        7.32 
Bottom of F 
zone 
nodule 
layer 
  13.77    9.25  8.79  7.27    7.06    8.6  7.31  8.19  8.74        6.97 
Concretions 
at base of F 
zone 
  5.07 – 
5.17 
                             
Top of D 
shear zone 
  -3.33                               
Bottom of D 
shear zone 
  -2.83                               
Top of 
Concretions 
in C zone 
  -3.93                          -1.08?     
Sandy 
lenses in 
A3 zone 
  -9.33                               
Bottom of 
borehole 
H
e
i
g
h
t
 
A
O
D
N
 
(
m
)
 
4.77  -12.33  6.35  3.7  3.39  4.97  12.1  4.76  7.45  1.8  3.56  5.44  -11.66  10.46  -8.133  10.54  -4.929 
Table 6.1 A summary of the principal levels recorded in each of the boreholes (see also Appendix 3) 
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7. Groundwater and Rainfall Monitoring 
 
7.1.  Rainfall 
 
Monthly rainfall data has been recorded at Hurn Airport, 25km west of Barton-on-Sea, 
since 1957. More locally records have been obtained since 1994 from Efford weather 
station (5km to the east of Barton-on-Sea) and, since June 1999, from the NFDC’s own 
rain gauge at Naish Farm holiday park (Fig. 1.2). Appendix 1 shows the data from Hurn, 
Efford and Naish Farm between January 1964 and December 2005, and readings since 
1990 are summarised in Table 7.1.  
 
The December 1992 Cliff House Hotel slide followed a particularly wet November, but 
this had been preceded by nearly three years of comparatively dry weather. It may be that 
the  re-wetting  of  strata  that  had  become  partially  dehydrated,  allowing  for  surface 
cracking opening pathways into the fissured clay, could have contributed to the landslide 
activity  in  1992.  Clay  soils  can  dry  to  considerable  depths  over  a  long  period  of 
desiccation (Rowell 1994) but the extent to which this opens fissures of several metres’ 
depth does not appear to have been studied.  
 
Rainfall in the last four months of 1993, preceding the December 1993 failure, was 93% 
up on the same period averaged over the previous five years, and the next major phase of 
movement at Cliff House Hotel, in February 2001, followed a period when rainfall at 
Efford for October to December 2000 amounted to 507.1mm, an increase of 81% over 
the average of the previous six years.  
 
It is important to realise the limitations of the rainfall data – a short intense storm in an 
otherwise dry period may deliver sufficient water to commence movement, whilst not 
producing a major peak in the monthly figures. Storms may also be more localised – the 
Hurn data was collected 25km from Barton-on-Sea. General trends of rainfall, however, 
are likely to be fairly well-represented by the available data. 
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The monthly survey point monitoring undertaken since 1995 shows certain trends when 
plotted against rainfall. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 address these trends for the two main study 
areas. 
 
7.2.  Response of Monitored Survey Points to Rainfall - Cliff House Hotel 
 
Fig. 7.1 illustrates movement down the western flank of the landslide area, and Fig. 7.2 
the eastern flank (see Fig. 7.3 for point locations).  
 
Movement appears associated with monthly rainfall figures exceeding c125mm, although 
there appears to be a lag of 1 – 3 months between high rainfall and displacement. The 
highest movement rates are observed in points downslope of the sheet-piling. All the 
western survey points show movement developing the month following the heavy rainfall 
of October 2000 (131.8mm), and high rainfall continuing before the catastrophic failure 
of 13
th February 2001. A metastable phase precedes a further period of heavy rain in 
March 2001 (121.8mm) and subsequent collapse in April.  
 
Only points A1 and A2 appear affected by the record November 2002 rainfall (209.2mm) 
and the peak in November 2003 (146.6mm), the other points seemingly having presently 
stabilised under the more natural drainage regime. A rise in elevation is observed at PIPE 
in January 1998 and at A4 at the February 2001 failure, possibly due either to backtilting 
or recording error.  
 
The eastern part of the Cliff House Hotel slide and the revetment area (Fig. 7.2) similarly 
show movement 1 – 2 months following the November 1997 (154.5mm), October 1998 
(142.5mm) and December 1999 (151.9mm) peaks. Most survey points showed seaward 
translation after the November 2000 peak (178.6mm – both October and December 2000 
rainfall also exceeded 130mm), which continued steadily until the 13
th February 2001 
failure. Point PZ1A (former inclinometer I1A), at a previously fairly stable site east of the 
1993 slide boundary slumped several weeks after the main failure oversteepened the cliff 
and was dislocated 30m into the undercliff.    97 
All the points still being surveyed experienced the same metastable phase seen on the 
western side of the slide, before being further displaced 1 - 2 months after the March 
2001 rainfall peak (121.8mm).  
 
Landslide toe movement is observed throughout winter 2002-3, commencing with the 
peak rainfall of November 2002 (209.2mm) and continuing until May 2003 (probably due 
to shallow mudsliding in the already-disrupted colluvium), whilst PZ1A commenced a 
further phase of settling in August 2002, which does not appear to be directly triggered 
by excessive rainfall. This survey point continues to move seaward but it is now located 
on the bank of the drainage gulley and its movement is likely to be governed by surface 
erosion processes rather than subsurface activity. 
 
The  three  most  recent  rainfall  peaks  to  exceed  115mm/month,  in  October  2004 
(116.6mm), October 2005 (131.8mm) and November 2006 (124mm) have not caused any 
significant recorded movement in the Cliff House Hotel area. 
 
7.3.  Response of Monitored Survey Points to Rainfall - Hoskins Gap West 
 
In Fig. 5.2 three profile lines (GL2, BT2 (also known as GL2A) and GL3) are shown. 
Although full profile data as recorded in Section 4.3 is not available for these transects 
selected points have been continuously surveyed. Fig. 5.8 gives a profile for line BT2, 
and Figs. 7.4 and 7.5 show time-series of movement in lines GL2 and GL3. Fig. 7.6 
shows a time-series for survey points near the centre of the slide. 
 
Line GL2 is west of the breach. Points GL2P2, landward of the sheet-piling, and GL2P3, 
formerly just to seaward of it, show seaward translation in steps commencing at times 
when monthly rainfall exceeded 125mm. GL2P4, 30m seaward of the original line of the 
sheet-pile,  shows  movement  that  lags  1-2  months  behind  the  highest  rainfall  (this 
movement may be delayed slumping into an area washed out by  mudslides). GL2P1 
showed minimal displacement until being lost in a cliff collapse in November 2000. The   98 
significant  displacement  of  GL2P2  and  GL2P3  following  this  collapse  are  possibly 
associated with the sliding of collapsed cliff material. 
 
Line GL3 (Fig. 5.2) crosses a section of the sheet-pile wall which has been translated to 
seaward but remains intact. GL3P1 (on a slumped block at the foot of the upper cliff) 
shows a stepwise reduction in elevation coinciding with months of rainfall exceeding 
125mm, although there is a two-month lag after the October 1998 peak. GL3P1, GL3P2 
and  GL3P3  all  show  seaward  movement  in  synchronous  steps.  GL3P4,  in  the  lower 
undercliff 20m seaward of GL3P3, shows a slight rise in elevation at the same time as a 
4m translation to seaward, shortly before being lost, suggesting the block on which the 
survey point sat was backtilted.  
 
The survey points in the centre of the landslide area (Fig. 7.6) show a response over a 
period of 1 – 2 months after rainfall exceeding 120mm. A more rapid and much greater 
displacement follows the heavy rainfall of October and November 2000, movement here 
continuing for two months on either side of the February 2001 collapse at Cliff House 
Hotel. The dramatic movement of the ‘newsheetpile’ points following December 2006 is 
related to displacement of the piling following breaching. 
 
7.4.  Piezometer Installation – Cliff House Hotel 
 
The presence of high groundwater pore pressures is a major factor in promoting ground 
instability  by  lubricating  between  soil  particles  or  subsurface  strata  and  reducing  the 
frictional  margin  of  safety  (Press  et  al  2003).  An  essential  component  of  landslide 
monitoring is, therefore, piezometer data. The earliest NFDC piezometer records date to 
19
th November 1991 and involved instruments mostly located in the undercliff near Cliff 
House Hotel (Rendel Geotechnics 1993b). Many of these were lost in subsequent land 
movements and in December 1994 additional piezometers were installed on the plateau 
behind  the  cliff  face  to  determine  water  drawdown  in  the  cliff.  Fig.  7.7  shows  the 
distribution of all these piezometers, and Figs. 7.8 and 7.9 give their readings.  
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Fig.  7.8  (the  undercliff  series)  shows  groundwater  levels  were  rising  consistently 
throughout 1992 in the colluvium at the toe of the Cliff House Hotel area (plot A4) as 
well as at a similar rate landward of the sheet-piling, close to where Rendel Geotechnics 
(1994b) would report water ponding in a developing graben during 1994 (plot A1). The 
middle two piezometers, however, located in the colluvium downslope of the sheet-pile 
wall, show relatively stable levels during the two years at the start of major activity at 
Cliff House Hotel. There is no summer-time drop in groundwater levels in any of the 
instruments, whilst the November 1992 rainfall peak caused an immediate rise in A1.  
 
The ‘B’ transect records show a similar trend, although B3, in particular, shows a high 
average level. The B2 record immediately downslope of the sheet-pile shows a sharp 
increase after November 1992 corresponding with the first failure of the sheet-piling in 
this area, and levels remained high until emergency drainage works were completed in 
March 1993. This shows that the drainage system was functioning as designed until the 
December  1992  failure.  B3  is  the  only  piezometer  where  groundwater  levels  closely 
mirror  rainfall, indicating a quick-draining response to this area. All the ‘A’ and  ‘B’ 
piezometers, with the exception of B1, were lost in the December 1993 failure.  
 
The  build-up  of  groundwater  in  the  lowest  two  piezometers,  A4  and  B4,  without  a 
corresponding increase in those within the colluvium above them is indicative of deep-
seated activity. The similar rate of rise in level in both the landslide toe and upslope of 
the sheet-pile suggests a link which by-passes the drainage system. However, this may 
also be due to the complexity and inhomogeneity of the strata (Barton pers. comm. 2007). 
 
The more recent data of Fig. 7.9 show a fairly stable situation on the plateau (the ‘P’ 
series  piezometers)  since  December  1994,  with  the  exception  of  P1  which  rose 
dramatically during 2001. This corresponded with the second major failure at Cliff House 
Hotel, and the loss of around 15m of cliff top close to P1. The anomaly in P5 in February 
2004 is believed to due to a faulty cap allowing rain water into the pipe. P2, P32 and P4 
are only a few metres from P5 and did not record any anomalous levels at that time.  
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The plateau piezometer groundwater peaks, plotted against monthly rainfall (Fig. 7.9) 
reveal a c2 month lag time between peak rainfall and peak groundwater. This is repeated 
over ten monthly rainfall peaks exceeding 125mm in twelve years of survey data, and 
causes groundwater level fluctuation of 0.25m – 1m. 
 
The  level  fluctuation  in  B1  is  more  complicated.  Peaks  in  March  1995,  June  1996, 
February 1998, March 1999, March, May and December 2001, March 2002 and February 
2005 all lag behind heavy rainfall periods, but by delays varying from two months to six, 
whilst in November – December 2003 the groundwater response to rainfall is almost 
immediate, and a peak groundwater level rising from June to September 2005 follows a 
long relatively dry period. The record rainfall of November 2002 (209.2mm) seems not to 
have affected B1 at all. B1 is in the upper undercliff and receives water through the 
Plateau Gravels (which can be expected to move relatively rapidly) and from slower and 
more tortuous movement through fissures and sandy and shelly pockets in the clay both 
from inland and within the cliff moving downslope. The February 2001 failure removed a 
large piece of cliff top very close to B1 (Section 4.7, Figs. 4.2j, 4.15) and this is likely to 
have changed the groundwater regime here, but the odd responses are difficult to explain. 
 
7.5.  Piezometer Installation - Hoskins Gap West 
 
Only three piezometers were installed in this area (Fig. 5.2). The only readings recorded 
by piezometers C1 to C3 are for the periods July 1991 to July 1995, during which an 
early significant rise in groundwater levels is followed by a period of high but stable 
levels, and a few measurements taken during 1999, when C2, then seaward of the sheet-
pile  wall,  is  noticeably  lower  (Fig.  7.10).  This  can  be  explained  by  the  developing 
landslide - as the wall began to move this disrupted the colluvium in which C2 was 
seated, opening cracks which would have drained more quickly. Boreholes BH1, BH3 
and BH5 formerly contained vibrating wire piezometers, but the records for these could 
not be located and they were no longer operational when the Hoskins Gap West activity 
became apparent.  
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Plot of significant movement against monthly rainfall - western edge of Cliff House Hotel landslide
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Plot of significant movement against monthly rainfall - western edge of Cliff House Hotel landslide
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Plot of significant movement against monthly rainfall - eastern edge of Cliff House Hotel landslide
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Fig. 7.2   104 
Plot of significant movement against monthly rainfall - eastern edge of Cliff House Hotel landslide (enlarged scale)
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Plot of significant movement against monthly rainfall - eastern edge of Cliff House Hotel landslide
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Fig. 7.3. Enlargement of Rendel’s 1998 geomorphological map with survey points superimposed, on the 2005 ortho-rectified aerial photograph of 
the Cliff House Hotel landslide area. The 2001 failure area falls mostly within the ‘active’ slide zone identified in 1998, (the site of the 1993 failures), 
although inclinometer PZ1A has been displaced into the ‘active’ zone by failure of the cliff behind. The rock revetment between the two 
strongpoints remains as bowed as in 2001 (Fig. 4.2j) and significant cliff top recession has taken place between 1998 (pink line identifying rear 
scarp) and 2005 (yellow line). Compiled from data provided by High-Point Rendel 1998d; Channel Coast Observatory and NFDC Coastal Group.   107 
Plot of significant vertical movement against rainfall - line GL2
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Fig. 7.4   108 
Plot of significant seaward movement against rainfall - line GL2
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Plot of significant vertical movement against rainfall - line GL3
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Fig. 7.5   110 
Plot of significant seaward movement against rainfall - line GL3
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Plot of significant vertical movement against rainfall - 
Hoskins Gap West
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Fig. 7.6   112 
Plot of significant vertical movement against rainfall - 
Hoskins Gap West
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Plot of significant seaward movement against rainfall - 
Hoskins Gap West
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Plot of significant seaward movement against rainfall -
Hoskins Gap West
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Fig. 7.7 Piezometer locations. B1 and P1-P7, together with Inclinometers I1A and I2 are as at the 
survey of January 1998. A1 to A4, B2 to B4 and B22 (adjacent to B2) are plotted from a map 
accompanying Rendel Geotechnics (1993b), and show their positions before the December 1993 
slide. Derived from Rendel’s 1993 and 1998 geomorphological maps and NFDC data from 1998. 
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Groundwater Piezometer Readings (Lines A1 / A2 / A3 / A4) - Nov 91 - Nov 93
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Fig. 7.8 Water levels from surface recorded in piezometers in the Cliff House Hotel area undercliff 
– transects A (above) and B (below) – see Fig. 7.7 for locations. Transect A was between Tom’s 
Garden and the main Cliff House Hotel landslide area, transect B to the east below Sea Road. 
The ‘1’ suffix denoted the upper bench area, ‘2’ the upper access track, ‘3’ the middle track and 
‘4’ the beach top behind the rock revetment. Derived from data collected at approximately weekly 
intervals by NFDC and modified from the NFDC spreadsheet. 
Groundwater Piezometer Readings (Lines B1/B2/B3/B4/B21/B22) - Sep1991 - Apr 1994
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Groundwater Piezometer Readings and monthly rainfall - Dec 94 - Dec 06
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Fig. 7.9 Water levels from surface recorded in piezometers located on the plateau near Cliff House Hotel. Derived from data collected at approx. 
weekly intervals by NFDC and modified from the NFDC spreadsheet.   118 
 
Groundwater Piezometer Readings (Lines C1 / C2 / C3) Jul 91 - Mar 00
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Fig. 7.10 Readings for the piezometers installed in the area of the failure at Hoskins Gap West.   119 
MONTH  Rainfall 
(mm) 
MONTH  Rainfall 
(mm) 
MONTH  Rainfall 
(mm) 
MONTH  Rainfall 
(mm) 
MONTH  Rainfall 
(mm) 
MONTH  Rainfall 
(mm) 
Jan-90  130.2  Jan-93  101.8  Jan-96  58.3  Jan-99  106.7  Jan-02  59.8  Jan-05  47.6 
Feb-90  172.5  Feb-93  9.8  Feb-96  95.2  Feb-99  35.3  Feb-02  105.2  Feb-05  13.2 
Mar-90  6.2  Mar-93  54.4  Mar-96  36.5  Mar-99  31.9  Mar-02  36.2  Mar-05  50.4 
Apr-90  41.4  Apr-93  98.8  Apr-96  36.2  Apr-99  75.3  Apr-02  23.2  Apr-05  73.4 
May-90  13.9  May-93  51.1  May-96  58.7  May-99  20.2  May-02  90  May-05  26.8 
Jun-90  50.2  Jun-93  57.2  Jun-96  26.7  Jun-99  82.4  Jun-02  36.8  Jun-05  49.2 
Jul-90  12.4  Jul-93  56.7  Jul-96  15.4  Jul-99  11.9  Jul-02  55.6  Jul-05  51 
Aug-90  21.4  Aug-93  35.6  Aug-96  76.7  Aug-99  98.9  Aug-02  56.4  Aug-05  41.6 
Sep-90  36.9  Sep-93  153.3  Sep-96  45.3  Sep-99  90.3  Sep-02  46.8  Sep-05  24.6 
Oct-90  95.3  Oct-93  163.5  Oct-96  58.5  Oct-99  61.7  Oct-02  77.8  Oct-05  131.8 
Nov-90  57.3  Nov-93  76.9  Nov-96  132  Nov-99  41.6  Nov-02  209.2  Nov-05  64.2 
Dec-90  66.5  Dec-93  178.7  Dec-96  34  Dec-99  151.9  Dec-02  109.8  Dec-05  51 
Jan-91  97.1  Jan-94  132.2  Jan-97  17.2  Jan-00  19.8  Jan-03  71  Jan-06  17.4 
Feb-91  35.7  Feb-94  89.4  Feb-97  82.2  Feb-00  52.2  Feb-03  45  Feb-06  55.2 
Mar-91  96.9  Mar-94  57.8  Mar-97  32  Mar-00  71.2  Mar-03  28.8  Mar-06  54 
Apr-91  44.2  Apr-94  61.3  Apr-97  13.2  Apr-00  118.4  Apr-03  40.2  Apr-06  16 
May-91  10.7  May-94  81.7  May-97  34.5  May-00  68.4  May-03  46.8  May-06  90.8 
Jun-91  111.5  Jun-94  23.4  Jun-97  75.8  Jun-00  33.8  Jun-03  47.6  Jun-06  8.8 
Jul-91  78.2  Jul-94  19.6  Jul-97  13.2  Jul-00  41.6  Jul-03  43.6  Jul-06  45.6 
Aug-91  12.1  Aug-94  47.6  Aug-97  84.1  Aug-00  27.2  Aug-03  20  Aug-06  18 
Sep-91  65.6  Sep-94  70.9  Sep-97  11.9  Sep-00  86  Sep-03  5.2  Sep-06  48 
Oct-91  96.4  Oct-94  125.8  Oct-97  68.2  Oct-00  131.8  Oct-03  84  Oct-06  114 
Nov-91  51.4  Nov-94  91.4  Nov-97  154.5  Nov-00  178.6  Nov-03  146.6  Nov-06  124 
Dec-91  35.2  Dec-94  116.9  Dec-97  100.6  Dec-00  132.6  Dec-03  117.6  Dec-06  75.2 
Jan-92  20.2  Jan-95  143.8  Jan-98  132.6  Jan-01  70.6  Jan-04  93.6  Jan-07  58.4 
Feb-92  31.8  Feb-95  116.8  Feb-98  8.7  Feb-01  50.2  Feb-04  32.4  Feb-07  55 
Mar-92  60.1  Mar-95  40.2  Mar-98  73.5  Mar-01  121.8  Mar-04  40.6  Mar-07  46.2 
Apr-92  83.9  Apr-95  27.1  Apr-98  90.1  Apr-01  61  Apr-04  70.2  Apr-07  3.4 
May-92  21.5  May-95  22.2  May-98  20.9  May-01  19.6  May-04  59.8  May-07  101 
Jun-92  28.4  Jun-95  10.1  Jun-98  84.7  Jun-01  26.2  Jun-04  24.4  Jun-07  101.4 
Jul-92  51.1  Jul-95  26.7  Jul-98  47.4  Jul-01  36  Jul-04  45  Jul-07  108.6  
Aug-92  89.7  Aug-95  3.4  Aug-98  20.9  Aug-01  39  Aug-04  83.8  Aug-07   34.2 
Sep-92  97.7  Sep-95  142.9  Sep-98  98.7  Sep-01  33.8  Sep-04  45.8  Sep-07    
Oct-92  52.7  Oct-95  38.6  Oct-98  142.5  Oct-01  127.8  Oct-04  116.6  Oct-07    
Nov-92  148.4  Nov-95  144.4  Nov-98  45.3  Nov-01  21.8  Nov-04  26.4  Nov-07    
Dec-92  96.5  Dec-95  81.7  Dec-98  94.15  Dec-01  33  Dec-04  65.2  Dec-07    
Table  7.1  Monthly  rainfall  records  from  Hurn,  Efford  and Naish  Farm (whichever  station  was 
functioning  nearest  to  Barton-on-Sea  at  the  time  of  survey).  For  full  details  see  Appendix  1. 
Periods of  particularly  high  rainfall  likely  to  trigger  landslide  activity  are highlighted  in  yellow. 
Derived from data from the Meteorological Office (Hurn) and NFDC (Efford and Naish Farm). 
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8. Discussion and Predictions 
 
8.1.  General Points 
 
It is a significant feature of the presence of the rock revetment that the toe of the landslide 
is allowed to remain intact. Where such revetments are absent, such as at Black Ven 
landslide in West Dorset, mudslide and debris material are removed by longshore drift 
and winnowing and the unstable area continues to oversteepen and remain active (Koh 
1992, Bray et al 2004 - SCOPAC website). Although the toe is pushed out at Barton, 
particularly under the Cliff House Hotel slide area, it remains a coherent mass and with 
each slide the undercliff approaches closer to the angle of repose of the colluvium.  
 
8.2.  Rainfall 
 
It would appear from the graphs in Section 7 that a ‘trigger’ monthly rainfall of c125mm 
(+/- 10mm) is sufficient to cause significant near-surface movement. At Hoskins Gap 
West the rapid response of recent movement to rainfall is indicative of the failure in this 
area being largely due to surface mudsliding, whilst the longer-period responses prior to 
the wall breaching can be associated with groundwater building up in the ‘reservoir’ area 
after a period of heavy rainfall. 
 
At Cliff House Hotel, where the slide plane is the deep-seated D zone, there is a tendency 
for movements to occur, if at all, during the 3 months after a period of heavy rainfall 
(usually  around  six  weeks  later).  Major  displacements  of  a  high  magnitude  occur 
infrequently. Movement is also seen to be associated not with individual monthly peak 
rainfall (e.g. the isolated peak of November 2002), but with high 3- and 4-monthly totals 
(such as the winter 2000-1 rain). 
 
Rainfall in the summer of 2007 has been exceptionally high, following a series of four 
years when both summers and winters were comparatively dry. The long dry period may 
have permitted the opening of quite deep desiccation cracks in the undercliff clay and   121 
colluvium. The rain in May-July 2007 is unlikely to be sufficient on its own to trigger 
further activity at Cliff House Hotel, and August has been much drier, but if wet weather 
returns during the early part of the autumn to top up an already high groundwater table 
there is the serious possibility of further movement here.  
 
8.3.  The Future at Cliff House Hotel 
 
As indicated in Section 4.9, the Cliff House Hotel landslide is a particularly complex 
situation and it is quite possible the two main phases of activity, although linked, were 
triggered  in  quite  different  manners.  The  deployment  of  several  inclinometers  and 
piezometers within the Tom’s Garden/Cliff House Hotel area would certainly improve 
understanding, but still may not lead to a solution. The prediction of future behaviour of 
this area of instability is, therefore, conjectural.  
 
Since 2001 there has been minimal displacement of survey points throughout the slide 
area (Fig. 7.3), and the semi-natural drainage channels are functioning fairly effectively, 
although the bogs in the centre of the landslide area and in the top graben given cause for 
concern. There is a case for improved drainage to these two areas, as high rainfall could 
provoke mudsliding into the central gulley. The relative stability of the Tom’s Garden 
area  suggests  that  the  surface  drains,  although  overgrown,  are  still  functioning,  as 
presumably are the mole drains at this end of the complex. The toe weighting provided by 
the revetment and rockfill on the seaward side of the ‘island’ allowed this area to remain 
intact (although translated) during the 2001 slide, and it is important that the revetment is 
properly maintained to ensure continued stability here. The eastern gulley has eroded 
quite steep slopes to several metres’ depth in the intact clay to the east and these may fail 
under conditions of sustained heavy rain. 
 
If another major phase of movement does occur at Cliff House Hotel is unlikely to push 
the landslide complex much further east (beyond the gulley cliff slumping mentioned 
above)  as  the  D  zone  /  mean  sea  level  juxtaposition  probably  forms  an  effective 
boundary. No significant displacement of the L4 survey points or others in the vicinity of   122 
Sea  Road  has  been  recorded  in  14  years  of  observation.  The  graben  area  under  the 
Plateau Gravels backscar at the top of the landslide area, and above Tom’s Garden to the 
west is a more likely candidate for displacement. Here sections of cliff face continue to 
separate and slump down into the graben, and several deep and poorly-drained bogs have 
developed  here, as  witnessed  on the  22
nd  August 2007  survey.  An  exceptionally  wet 
winter  (such  as  preceded  the  1993  and  2001  failures)  may  lead  to  excessive  pore 
pressures in the clay under the backscar and provoke another cliff collapse, following a 
similar process to the one described for the 2001 failure in Section 4.9. 
 
8.4.  The Future at Hoskins Gap West 
 
This prediction is based on the hypothesis given in Section 5.4. As stated there, if further 
information  came  to  light  concerning  the  instability  the  hypothesis,  and  also  this 
prediction, would need to be reassessed. The provision of an inclinometer landward of 
the wall near to MH18 might be particularly useful in this regard. 
 
The movement of the sheet-pile at the breach is likely to continue during wet conditions, 
with  surface  mudsliding.  This  may  exhibit  some  excavation  into  and  removal  of  the 
colluvium  on  the  bench  in  a  similar  manner  to  that  described  in  Brunsden  &  Jones 
(1976). This could oversteepen local cliffs either side of the mudslide track leading to 
small-scale slumping and spalling. It is possible that this area could stabilise in the longer 
term if the revetment is maintained to defend the landslide toe, but this will involve much 
movement of colluvium while the slope becomes reprofiled to the angle of repose. The 
area  most  at  risk  of  erosion  is  the  colluvium  downslope  of  the  breach  and  west  of 
Strongpoint 15 where the surface water and mudslides are eroding the reprofiled slope 
along the upper access roadway. This may lead to erosion of the roadway and progressive 
failure of the wall east towards Hoskins Gap. 
 
If the wall is restored, to a deeper level founded below the F zone concretions, with a 
deeper cut-off drain and a new pipe drain of larger dimensions placed along the line of 
the  gulley  that  has  opened  up  since  the  breach,  this  area  will  probably  be  stabilised   123 
sooner. The importance of ensuring the adequacy of such a new construction cannot, 
however, be underestimated, as if this new drainage system is overloaded this could lead 
to the instability migrating downdip to a point where water can again seep under the wall. 
Although the anchored sheet-pile installed at Hoskins Gap in 1987 has prevented major 
movement  here  incremental  displacement  has  continued  (see  inclinometer  data  and 
topographic surveys). If reactivation here is inadvertently promoted by works to the west 
this will endanger clifftop properties around Barton Court, which are of somewhat greater 
economic value than the open grassland and car park at the top of the cliff near the 
presently active area. 
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9. Conclusions  
 
This project has: 
•  Accumulated, analysed and assessed a wide range of data, including: 
o  Borehole logs 
o  Inclinometer Readings 
o  Piezometer Readings 
o  Aerial and Ground Photographs 
o  Engineering Drawings 
o  Consultants’ Reports 
o  Monthly Rainfall Records 
o  Personal Recollections of Technical Staff employed on the Barton Cliffs 
o  Newspaper Reports 
o  Field Observations made by the author 
•  Produced  maps  of  the  landslide  areas  studied  and  the  surface  drainage  pattern 
currently observed 
•  Related features of instability to observed and inferred planes of weakness within 
the stratigraphy of the Barton cliffs 
•  Provided  preliminary  interpretations  of  the  processes  that  have  contributed  to 
failure at Cliff House Hotel and at Hoskins Gap West, based on all the available 
information 
•  Provided  a  prediction  of  possible  future  development  of  the  two  studied 
complexes, based on the preliminary interpretations above 
•  Offered a new interpretation for the instability previously ascribed to the F1/F2 
zone boundary 
•  Highlighted the potential significance of: 
o  the cut-off drain depth in relation to the sand/clay boundary;  
o  the sheet-piling depth in relation to the F zone concretions 
o  unloading of the Cliff House Hotel landslide toe in 1993, concurrent with 
excessive rainfall   125 
•  Suggested links between the stabilisation of one area and the destabilisation of 
another 
 
 
 
All photographs not otherwise attributed were taken by the author during site visits in 
June to September 2007. 
 
Wordcount 18,855 words 
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Appendix 1 – Rainfall 
 
Rainfall data recorded in the Barton area, initially at Hurn (green), then Efford weather station (blue) and subsequently at Naish Farm 
(maroon). Data from Met Office historic data website (Hurn) and NFDC archive (Efford and Naish Farm) 
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1992 Rainfall Figures (Hurn)
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1998 Rainfall Figures - Efford
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Appendix 2 – Cross-Shore Profiles recorded at Cliff House Hotel 
 during 1993-5, and 2007 
 
 
Data courtesy of the John Cross archive (1993-5) and Channel Coast Observatory (2007). 
See Fig. 4.14 for profile locations. 
 
Notes: 
 
Profile L1 
This does not appear greatly changed by the 1993 activity, but has seen c5m retreat of the 
entire  profile  down  to  just  below  the  F  zone  concretions,  together  with  10m  seaward 
movement of the landslide toe in 2001. This demonstrates the greater extent of the 2001 
landslide area, which included the area between the western boundary of the 1993 failure and 
the Tom’s Garden surface drain system, as  well as significant  areas between the eastern 
boundary and Sea Road. 
 
Profile L2 
The most dramatic change in the December 1993 slide is observed in L2, close to the major 
spring under Cliff House Hotel. Here the cliff top retreated around 4m down to the +20m 
AODN contour, a c4m-wide bench at +13m AODN grew to nearly 30m width and the toe of 
the landslide pushed out the shoreline by c10m. A much greater change is observed between 
the 1995 and 2007 surveys. This has produced a further 15m retreat of the cliff top, opening 
of a 20m-wide, 3m-deep graben where the +13m AODN bench formerly was and seaward 
displacement of the lower slope by an additional 10m. 
 
Profile L3 
Significant disruption was also noted in 1993 in Profile L3, below the +18m AODN contour, 
where this line met the gulley created by the Cliff House Hotel spring outflow stream. Below 
this line around 5m width of colluvium had been moved downslope to a pre-existing bench at 
+5m AODN and the toe pushed 8m to seaward (Fig. 4.6). The upper section of undercliff 
here was not affected in 1993, but in the 2001 failure 10m of clifftop retreat is coupled with   142 
significant shallowing of the profile slope throughout the undercliff, with erosion above and 
deposition below the F zone concretion horizon. The lower undercliff exhibits a step-like 
profile of displaced (and some backtilted) slumped blocks derived from the cliff top. The 
former  location  of  Inclinometer  I1/I1A  was  adjacent  to  the  point  where  this  profile  is 
intersected by the upper longshore transect (Fig. 4.14). 
 
Profile L4 
This profile shows minimal change over the entire period October 1993 to August 2007, the 
slight elevation at the seaward end being due to the enhancement of the rock revetment. 
 
The other profiles only record an eighteen-month period between the two major slides and 
show minimal movement, mostly small-scale spalling of the Plateau Gravels backscar or 
slope readjustment (or revetment reconstruction) near the landslide toe. 
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Profile L1A
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Profile L2A
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Profile L4
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Appendix 3 – Borehole logs 
 
Please note the file for page 4 of log B21 was corrupted after scanning and has been 
reconstituted. Logs kindly provided by Soil Mechanics Ltd, NFDC and High-Point 
Rendel.  149   150   151   152   153   154   155   156   157   158   159   160   161   162   163   164   165   166   167   168   169   170   171 
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